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ABSTRACT
Executive’s Education and Performance of REITs
Shicheng Tang
Top executives with business decision-making power, including CEO, CFO and COO, are
the core of a company’s business activities, their business decisions influenced by their own
abilities will naturally affect the company performance. As an expected proxy of executive’s
ability, this paper focuses on the executive’s education, and studies the impact of executive’s
education on the performance of REITs by using the data of executive’s education and financial
performance of 288 U.S. REITs companies from 2000 to 2018. As for the results of the empirical
examinations, this paper finds that, first, there is no significant relationship between executive’s
individual education and the performance of REITs. However, executive’s high individual
education has a significantly negative impact on the performance of REITs if there is enough
discretionary cash. Second, as for the executive team of CEO and CFO, there is a significantly
positive impact of the education of executive team in which CEO has no high education and
CFO has high education on the performance of REITs. Finally, as for the executive team of CEO,
CFO and COO, there is a significantly positive impact of the education of executive team in
which CEO has no high education and at least one of CFO and COO has high education on the
performance of REITs, and the best executive team with greater positive impact on the
performance of REITs is the one in which CEO has no high education and one of CFO and COO
has high education.
Key Words: company performance, REITs, executive’s education, overconfidence
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1. Introduction
One of the most important proposes of a company’s business activities carried out by
executives is to achieve a better company performance. It is precisely for this reason that many
studies in the field of modern corporate finance focus on the topic related to the improvement of
company performance, and concentrate on the factors that significantly positively affect the
company performance.
Meanwhile, when it comes to the factors that affect the company performance, top
executives, as the core of a company’s management and business activities, are expected to
affect the company performance by their abilities. Specifically, they are the ones who have
dominant power of business decisions-making, and generally they manage the company and
make business decisions by using their own abilities. Therefore, the abilities of company’s top
executives play an important role in the quality of management and business decisions which
will be reflected in company performance, that is, the abilities of company’s top executives are
expected to have significant impact on company performance.
As for the executive’s ability, it may be jointly affected by many factors, such as education,
working experience, leadership ability and personality characteristics. As mentioned in the study
of Bhagat, Bolton and Subramanian (2010), it is not easy to accurately measure these factors,
however, comparing with other factors, the measuring of executive’s individual education should
be relatively easier and more accurate, since executive’s individual education can be observed
directly and precisely. In addition, some previous studies, like Barro and Lee (2010) and Cohen
and Soto (2007), consider the educational attainment as a reasonable proxy for the stock of
human capital.
Therefore, precisely because of the direct and accurate measuring of executive’s individual
education, and also the views of previous studies that consider education as a proxy of the stock
of human capital, many following studies consider executive’s individual education as a proxy of
executive’s ability and expect that executives with higher education have higher individual
abilities. These studies focus on the relationship between the top executive’s individual
education, mainly CEO, and top executive’s hiring, turnover, and company performance, and
hypothesize that CEO’s individual educational characteristics have significant impact on
company performance.
As measuring the CEO’s educational characteristics which are considered as the proxies of
CEO’s ability, previous studies use some observed CEO’s individual educational information as
the measures of CEO’s individual education, such as the ranking of schools, educational
qualifications and degrees and also professional expertise.
In the conclusion, these previous studies find mixed results of the impact of CEO’s
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individual education on company performance.
Some previous studies find no significant impact of CEO’s individual education on
company performance. Bhagat, Bolton and Subramanian (2010) find that CEO’s individual
education significantly affects CEO’s hiring decisions, however, there is no significant impact of
CEO’s individual education on long-term company performance. Moreover, Gottesman and
Morey (2006) focus on the quality of CEO’s individual education and the company performance.
The results show that there is no significant relationship between CEO’s individual educational
quality and the company performance, and also no significant relationship between CEO’s
individual educational qualification and the company performance. In addition, they also find
that CEOs with non-MBA and non-law graduate degrees slightly perform better than their
counterparts.
However, there are some opposite results in other studies. Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert (2002)
focus on the largest U.S. firms and find that both CEO’s university and degree significantly
affect the company performance. Darmadi (2013) examines the impact of individual educational
qualification of board members, including CEO, on company performance and finds that the
company performance can be explained by CEO’s individual educational qualification. In
addition, Wai and Rindermann (2015) find that the higher CEO’s individual education and
cognitive ability have positive impact on gross revenue of company. Bertrand and Schoar (2003)
examine whether and how individual managers affect the corporate behavior and performance,
and suggest that the manager’s MBA degree has positive impact on manager’s performance.
Based on the previous studies, from more different and new perspectives and aspects, this
paper focuses on the relationship between executive’s education and the company performance
of U.S. REITs, and empirically examines the impact of executive’s high education on
performance of REITs.
First of all, regarding the industry studied, this paper focuses on the industry of real estate.
Specifically, for more available observations of executive’s individual education and the
financial performance of company, and also for more accurate empirical examinations, this paper
focuses on the Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). This paper directly focuses on the impact
of executive’s education on performance of REITs, and therefore effectively analyses the
relationship between executive’s education and the performance of REITs.
REITs is an industry that operates more specialized business and primarily invests in real
estate projects. As mentioned in Eichholtz and onder (2014), REITs companies almost invest
all their assets in the projects of real estate, in other words, the performance of REITs can be
accurately reflected by the overall profitability of REITs investments in real estate projects.
Moreover, as the predominantly business activity, the executives in REITs are mainly
focused on making business decisions related to the real estate projects. Therefore, it can be
expected that the performance of REITs that can be reflected by the profitability of the real estate
projects invested by REITs is a comprehensive and accurate reflection of REITs executives’
abilities, as measured by executives’ individual education.
In addition, Eichholtz and onder (2014) also mention that, as the advantage for a more
accurate and comprehensive empirical analysis, the investment and divestment activities of
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REITs and the value of all the assets held by REITs can be observed with precision.
Second, regarding the empirical examinations of the impact of executive’s education on
performance of REITs in this paper, first, this paper uses the data of executive’s education and
the financial performance of 288 U.S. REITs companies from 2000 to 2018. In addition, to
examine whether executive’s higher education positively affect the performance of REITs, based
on the ranking of schools, this paper divides REITs executives in sample into two categories, that
are, executives who graduated from Top 20 schools and from the schools after Top 20. Then, this
paper defines “high education” of REITs executives as the education of Top 20 schools.
Third, and more importantly, based on the previous studies, this paper tries to make
contribution and some improvements of empirical analysis related to the impact of executive’s
education on performance of REITs, specifically, this paper employs the empirical analysis in
two parts.
The first part of empirical analysis is the examination of the relationship between
executive’s individual education and the performance of REITs, that is, to examine whether
executive’s high individual education positively affect the performance of REITs.
As for the company’s executives, it can be noted that, most of previous studies mainly
analyze the relationship between CEO’s individual education and the company performance.
However, except for the CEOs, who have the dominant business decision-making power, are
expected to affect the company performance by the business decisions they make based on their
abilities, other top executives, such as the CFOs and COOs, also have important business
decision-making power and frequently participate in company’s management and business
activities, they are also expected to affect the company performance by their business decisions
based on their abilities. Therefore, this paper not only focuses on the CEO’s individual education,
but also considers the impact of the CFO’s individual education on performance of REITs.
In summary, in the first part of empirical analysis, as for the examination of the impact of
executive’s individual education on performance of REITs, this paper focuses on CEO’s and
CFO’s individual education, and examines whether there is a significant relationship between
CEO’s and CFO’s individual education and the performance of REITs, respectively.
Moreover, based on the first part of empirical analysis, this paper makes some
improvements of the empirical analysis by employing the second part of empirical analysis.
Specifically, in this part, this paper studies the joint impact of executives’ education on
performance of REITs. As mentioned above, most of previous studies focus on the impact of
executive’s individual education on company performance, however, the company’s top
executives frequently cooperate with each other in company’s business activities. It is expected
that, as an executive team, the combination of their education affects the company performance
by the business decisions that executives make based on their own knowledge and abilities.
Therefore, this paper examines the relationship between the education of executive teams with
different combinations of executive’s individual education and the performance of REITs, and
tries to find a best executive team of which the combination of executive’s individual education
has a greater positive impact on performance of REITs, comparing with other executive teams
with different combinations of executive’s individual education.
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Based on this view of point, in the second part of empirical analysis, there will be a
two-step examination. In the first step, this paper examines the relationship between the joint
education of executive team of CEO and CFO and the performance of REITs. Specifically, this
paper views CEO and CFO, two of the most important executives in the top executive team, as
an executive team. Then, this paper divides the executive team of CEO and CFO into three
categories, based on the different combinations of executive’s individual education. First, the
executive team of CEO and CFO, which is called “CEO Leadership”, represents the executive
team of CEO and CFO in which CEO has no Top 20 school education and CFO has Top 20
school education. The executive team of “CEO Leadership” comprehensively displays the
leadership skill for a CEO, as a CEO with lower education leads executives with high education.
Second, the executive team of CEO and CFO, which is called “Team Top 20”, represents the
executive team of CEO and CFO in which both CEO and CFO have Top 20 school education.
The executive team of “Team Top 20” effectively shows the high-educated cooperation among
executives in the executive team, as a CEO with high education leads executives with similar
high education. Third, the executive team of CEO and CFO, which is called “Dominant CEO”,
represents the executive team of CEO and CFO in which CEO has Top 20 school education and
CFO has no Top 20 school education. The executive team of “Dominant CEO” directly shows
the CEO’s dominant role in the executive team, as a CEO with high education leads executives
with lower education. In summary, as mentioned above for the three categories of executive team
of CEO and CFO, as an improvement of empirical analysis, this paper examines the relationship
between the joint education of executive team of CEO and CFO and the performance of REITs
by focusing on the impact of different cooperative relationships within the executive team based
on the different executives’ positions that are affected by different combinations of executive’s
individual education on performance of REITs.
In the second step, as a robustness examination, this paper also examines the relationship
between the joint education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO and the performance of
REITs.
Specifically, there are two examinations in the second step. First, for a more general
examination, this paper examines the relationship between the education of executive team in
which, regardless of the education of CEO, there may be zero, one or two of CFO and COO with
Top 20 school education and the performance of REITs. Second, for a more comprehensive and
accurate examination, similar to the examination of the impact of the education of executive
team of CEO and CFO on performance of REITs, this paper also divides the executive team of
CEO, CFO and COO into three categories, based on the different combinations of executive’s
individual education, and uses a stricter criterion of the education of CEO to examine the
relationship between the joint education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO and the
performance of REITs. To be specific, by assuming that CEO has no Top 20 school education,
this paper examines the relationship between the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and
COO in which there is one, two or at least one of CFO and COO with Top 20 school education
and the performance of REITs.
Using this two-step examination in the second part of empirical analysis, this paper tries to
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find the best educational combination of executive team that has greater positive impact on
performance of REITs.
In addition, for both the empirical examinations of “individual education” and “joint
education of executive team”, this paper also examines the interactive impact of “executive’s
education” and “cash holdings”, as mentioned by Eichholtz and onder (2014) who focus on the
impact of manager’s overconfidence on company performance, they examine the interactive
impact of overconfidence and cash on performance of REITs, and find that cash significantly
affects company performance by influencing manager’s investment behavior. Therefore, it is
expected that cash holdings affect the business decision-making of executives with different
management styles based on different education.
This paper uses the data of executive’s education and the financial performance of 288 U.S.
REITs companies from 2000 to 2018, and applies OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) models to
examine the following questions. First, the relationship between executive’s (CEO and CFO)
individual education and the performance of REITs. Second, the relationship between the
education of executive team of CEO and CFO and the performance of REITs. Third, the
relationship between the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO and the
performance of REITs. Fourth, is there a best executive team of which the combination of
executive’s individual education can perform a better performance of REITs.
Following the empirical examinations, this paper finds that, first, there is no significant
relationship between CEO’s individual education and the performance of REITs, while CFO’s
individual education has a relatively significant impact on performance of REITs. However, as
considering the interactive impact of executive’s individual education and cash holdings, there is
significantly negative impact of executive’s (CEO and CFO) high individual education on
performance of REITs, if there is enough discretionary cash. Second, there is a significantly joint
impact of the education of executive team of CEO and CFO on performance of REITs,
specifically, there is a significantly positive impact of the education of executive team of CEO
and CFO in which CEO has no high education and CFO has a high education on performance of
REITs. Third, there is a significantly positive impact of the education of executive team of CEO,
CFO and COO in which CEO has no high education and at least one of CFO and COO has high
education on performance of REITs. Fourth, the best executive team that has greater positive
impact on performance of REITs is the one in which CEO has no high education and one of CFO
and COO has high education.
The paper is arranged as follows. The second part is Literature Review, the third part is
Research Background and Hypothesis. The fourth part is Data and Method, the fifth part is
Results of Empirical Examinations, and the sixth part is Conclusion and Discussion.
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2. Literature Review
Top executives who are the core of a company’s business activities normally make business
decisions and manage the company based on their own abilities that can be jointly affected by
different factors, such as knowledge, expertise, work experience, insights, leadership ability and
personality characteristics. As for executive’s education, many previous studies focus on the
relationship between the individual education of CEO, who has the dominant business
decision-making power and is considered as the most important executive in the company, and
the company performance.
To be specific, as for empirical examinations of the relationship between CEO’s individual
education and the company performance, they consider some measures, including the ranking of
schools, educational qualifications and degrees and professional expertise, as the proxies of the
CEO’s individual educational characteristics, and then employ models to empirically examine
the impact of CEO’s individual education on company performance, in other words, whether the
higher individual education of CEO positively affects company performance. Among these
related previous studies, in the conclusion, there are mixed results of the impact of CEO’s
individual education on company performance, and in some studies, there are also some puzzled
results when using different measures of CEO’s individual education and company performance,
and different periods.
2.1 Insignificant Relationship Between CEO’s Individual Education and Company
Performance
As for mixed results, some previous studies find that there is no significant relationship
between CEO’s individual education and the company performance.
Bhagat, Bolton and Subramanian (2010) focus on the impact of CEO’s individual education,
they consider that CEO’s ability consists of observable and quantifiable factors, such as
education and work experience, and also unobservable and potentially non-quantifiable factors,
such as leadership and team-building skills. Therefore, as an objective and easily measurable
factor, education can be expected to play an important role in the evaluation of CEO’s ability and
then, CEO’s hiring and company performance. They use some measures of CEO’s education,
including the ranking of schools, qualifications and degrees, and firstly examine whether CEO’s
individual education is one of the appropriate measures of the evaluation of CEO’s ability, then
also examine whether CEO’s individual education has a significant impact on CEO’s hiring,
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turnover decision and company performance. In the conclusion, they find that CEO’s individual
education significantly affects CEO’s hiring decisions, however, there is no significant
relationship between CEO’s individual education and the long-term company performance.
Arioglu (2014) investigates the relationship between the education and the professional
expertise of directors in listed firms of Borsa Istanbul and director’s valuation. It showed that,
comparing with the directors with lower educational qualifications and with no professional
expertise, there is a higher proportion of directors with higher educational qualifications or
professional expertise, such as accounting, are employed in board committees, and also assigned
as independent directors. However, as for the CEO or the chairman of company, there is a lower
proportion of directors with higher educational qualifications or professional expertise work in
these positions. They suggest that the educational level and professional skills are more
important in valuing the directors of board committees, but not in valuing the top executives,
such as CEO and chairman.
Gottesman and Morey (2006) examine the relationship between CEO’s educational quality
and the company performance, and also the relationship between CEO’s qualification and the
company performance. They consider CEO’s educational quality as a factor that affects company
performance because some studies assume that managers with higher education will be more
adaptive and innovative, and more likely to have other characteristics that may improve the
company performance. In the conclusion, they find that, first, as viewing the mean entrance score
as the proxy of the prestige of undergraduate and graduate programs, companies with CEOs from
more prestigious schools will not significantly perform better than companies with CEOs from
less prestigious schools. Second, as for CEO’s qualification, companies with CEOs who have
MBA or law degrees will not significantly perform better than companies with CEOs who have
no graduate degrees. Moreover, companies with CEOs who have non-MBA and non-law
graduate degrees slightly perform better than other companies.
Although the studies above find no significant relationship between CEO’s individual
education and the company performance, they suggest that educational quality, qualification and
professional expertise are important in valuing and hiring CEO and other executives, in other
words, education is one of the most important factors in measuring executive’s ability.
2.2 Positive Relationship Between CEO’s Individual Education and Company Performance
In contrast, some studies find that there is significantly positive relationship between CEO’s
individual education and the company performance.
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) investigate whether and how individual managers affect
company behavior and performance. They use a manager-firm matched panel data and find that
the heterogeneity in investment, financial, and organizational practices of company can be
significantly explained by manager’s fixed effect. Moreover, there is a significant relationship
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between management style, which is different across managers, and the manager’s fixed effect,
which is related to the company performance, measured by Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s
Q. Then, as for the manager’s educational characteristics, they find that, as measured by ROA,
the performance of manager with an MBA degree will be 1% higher than that of manager
without an MBA degree, and manager who has an MBA degree generally more aggressive on
business strategies.
King, Srivastav and Williams (2016) use a data of U.S. bank that matches CEO’s
educational characteristics and firm-specific experience with CEO’s compensation and other
bank characteristics, and find that CEO’s educational fixed effect is associated with the bank
performance. Moreover, the profitability of the banks with CEOs who have better MBA scores is
significantly higher than that of the banks with non-MBA CEOs. Based on the results, they
consider that the riskier and more innovative business mode that CEOs with better MBA
education tend to employ positively affects the company performance.
Darmadi (2013) focuses on the developing economy and examines the impact of
educational qualifications of board members, including CEO, on performance of Indonesian
listed firms, as measuring the company performance by Tobin’s Q and Return on Assets (ROA).
Darmadi (2013) uses postgraduate degrees, degrees obtained from prestigious universities,
degrees obtained from developed countries, and degrees in financial disciplines as the proxies of
educational qualifications of board members and employs the models for the supervisory boards,
management boards, and CEOs, respectively. In the result, Darmadi (2013) finds that the
educational qualifications of board members and CEOs are associated with the company
performance.
Wai and Rindermann (2015) examine the extent to which Fortune 500 CEOs were selected
on education and cognitive ability from 1996 to 2014. They find that between 37.5% and 41.0%
of CEOs in sample had attended an elite school which is likely the reason that promotes them to
be the ones with top 1% of cognitive ability. In addition, they also examine the relationship
between CEO’s individual education and the company financial performance, and find that the
higher CEO’s education and cognitive ability have positive impact on gross revenue of company.
Girbina, Albu, C. N. and Albu, N. (2012) focus on listed companies of Romania and find
that there is a significantly positive relationship between the proportion of board members with a
postgraduate degree in financial field and the company performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q.
In addition, they also find that there is a higher proportion of board members with a degree in
financial field in bigger companies and companies with more concentrated ownership.
2.3 Puzzled Results
Except for the studies that suggest the positive impact of CEO’s individual education on
company performance, some other studies find that there is negative impact of CEO’s individual
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education on company performance, and also find puzzled results when using different measures
of CEO’s individual education and company performance, and different periods.
Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert (2002) examine the individual education of CEOs from the largest
U.S. firms in the Forbes 800 Compensation list and find some mixed results of the relationship
between CEO’s individual education and the company performance. Specifically, they find that
both CEO’s university and degree can explain the company performance, as measured by Return
on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q. As for ROA, there is no significant difference in ROA between
the companies with CEOs from combined schools and the companies with CEOs from combined
undergraduate schools, however, the companies with CEOs from Big graduate schools perform
better ROA than other companies. Moreover, as for Tobin’s Q, it shows that education is one of
the most important explanatory variables of Tobin’s Q, and CEOs from the schools of which
many graduates work in the position of CEO are less likely to perform higher Tobin’s Q than
other CEOs.
Morresi (2017) analyzes the impact of CEO’s individual education on performance of
European listed companies and finds puzzled results of the relationship between CEO’s
individual education and the company performance. Specifically, there is no significant impact
of the individual education of CEOs who are from higher ranking universities and with more
qualifications on improving company performance. However, as using the 5-year changes of
company performance, there is significantly higher improvement of company performance for
companies which are managed by CEOs from higher ranking universities. Morresi (2017)
considers that the results indicate that CEO’s individual education is one of the methods for
individual and institutional investors to reduce the information asymmetry of CEO’s quality and
ability.
2.4 Negative Relationship Between CEO’s Individual Education and Company
Performance
As for the negative relationship between CEO’s individual education and the company
performance, Miller and Xu (2019) find that, comparing with non-MBA CEOs, CEOs with MBA
degrees are better with business of short-term strategic expedients, however, these strategies
have negative impact on company’s market valuation.
In summary, all the previous studies above focus on the relationship between the CEO’s
individual education and the company performance. In the empirical examinations, as for the
measures of executive’s individual education, they use the ranking of schools, educational
qualifications and degrees and professional expertise. As for the company performance, most of
previous studies use Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q. In addition, many previous studies
focus on the larger listed companies in stock exchange because the data of CEOs’ individual
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education and company financial performance are more readily available.
In the conclusion, previous studies find mixed results of the relationship between CEO’s
individual education and the company performance, as mentioned above. Some studies find that
there is significantly or slightly significantly positive or negative relationship between CEO’s
individual education and the company performance, while others suggest that there is no
significant relationship between CEO’s individual education and the company performance, in
addition, some studies find puzzled results when using different measures of CEO’s individual
education and company performance, and different periods.
In this paper, as mentioned above, it examines the relationship between executive’s
education and the performance of REITs by employing two parts of empirical examinations.
First, it examines the relationship between executive’s individual education and the performance
of REITs. Second, it examines the relationship between the education of executive team of CEO
and CFO, and CEO, CFO and COO, respectively, and the performance of REITs. In general, this
paper examines whether the higher and better executive’s education will positively affect the
performance of REITs, and tries to find the best executive team of which the combination of
executive’s individual education has a greater positively impact on performance of REITs.
For establishing the models of empirical examinations, in the next part, this paper first
observes and analyses the relationship between executive’s education and the performance of
REITs by using the charts showing the executive’s education and the performance of REITs in
sample.
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3. Research Background and Hypothesis
As for the relationship between executive’s education and the company performance, some
previous studies consider that managers with higher education will be more adaptive and
innovative, and more likely to have other characteristics that may improve the company
performance, they suggest that high executive’s education positively affects the company
performance. Moreover, from another perspective, some studies support the view that the
high-ranking schools that CEOs attend is the reason that promotes them to be the ones with top
1% of cognitive ability, and find that executive’s high education and cognitive ability positively
affect the company performance. However, other studies find that there is no significant
relationship between executive’s education and the company performance.
Specifically, in these empirical analyses, they use the ranking of schools, educational
qualifications and degrees and professional expertise as the measures of executive’s education,
and use Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q as the measures of company performance.
Therefore, based on the previous studies and analysis ideas of this paper discussed in
Introduction part, this part analyses the relationship between executive’s education and the
performance of REITs by using the following four charts showing executive’s education and
performance of REITs, based on the data of executive’s education and financial performance of
288 U.S. REITs from 2000 to 2018, and puts forward some ideas and hypotheses for the
relationship between executive’s individual education and the performance of REITs, and also
the relationship between the education of executive team and the performance of REITs,
respectively.
**Insert Figure 1 about here**
As shown in Figure 1, it shows executive’s individual education and the average quarterly
performance of 288 U.S. REITs in each year from 2000 to 2018, there are totally 19730
observations for the whole period in sample.
The bars in blue, orange and gray, called “Top 20 CEO”, “Top 20 CFO”, and “Top 20
COO”, represent the proportion of CEO, CFO and COO who graduated from Top 20 schools in
each year, respectively, the lines in yellow, blue and green represent the average value of
quarterly performance of REITs, measured by Tobin’s Q, ROA (Return on Assets) and ROE
(Return on Equity), of all companies in each year, respectively. The abscissa shows the year, the
primary ordinate on the left shows the value of proportion of CEO, CFO and COO from Top 20
schools, and the secondary ordinate on the right shows the average value of performance of
REITs.
From this chart, it can be seen that, except for the period from 2008 to 2012 (period of
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financial crisis) in which the values of measures (Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE) of average
performance of REITs are low, in other years, the values of measures of average performance of
REITs remain at a relatively stable and increasing state.
As for the significant decrease of the average performance of REITs during financial crisis
period, it is related to weak economic environment, the negative impact of financial crisis on
performance of REITs is independent of the impact of executive’s education on performance of
REITs. Therefore, this paper examines the relationship between executive’s education and the
performance of REITs at the whole period level.
As shown in the chart, the average Tobin’s Q, with the value range from 1.15 to 1.61,
remains almost at a horizontal level during the whole period, the average ROA, with the value
range from 2.47 to 5.44, remains at a relatively stable and increasing state, except for the period
of financial crisis, and average ROE, with the value range from 6.01 to 12.48, shows a similar
trend to that of ROA.
In addition, the proportions of CEO, CFO and COO with Top 20 school education slightly
increase or decrease during the period. To be specific, the proportion of “Top 20 CEO”, with the
value range from 0.16 to 0.31, is always the highest among the proportions of these three
positions. It increases slightly from 2000 to 2005, and remains at a horizontal level from 2006 to
2009, then, it shows a very small increase from 2010 to 2015, and decreases after 2015.
Comparing with the proportion of “Top 20 CEO”, the proportion of “Top 20 CFO”, with the
value range from 0.07 to 0.18, is in a state of steady and slightly increasing during the period. As
for the proportion of “Top 20 COO”, with the value range from 0.06 to 0.12, it changes more
frequently, but slightly. It increases slightly from 2000 to 2003, and decreases from 2004 to 2006,
then, it increases slowly and slightly from 2007 to 2014, and from 2015 to 2018, there is an
obvious decline.
In addition, the proportion of “Top 20 CFO” is always lower than that of “Top 20 CEO”,
but higher than the proportion of “Top 20 COO”. It may imply that, comparing with the position
of COO, education is more important in the evaluation of executives working in the positions of
CEO and CFO, when the board of directors hires executives for company.
In summary, Figure 1 preliminarily shows the general relationship between executive’s
individual education and the performance of REITs. Overall, as for the inconsistent trends
between the proportions of CEO and COO with Top 20 school education and the average
quarterly performance of REITs, and the slightly consistent trends between the proportion of
CFO with Top 20 school education and the average quarterly performance of REITs, it can be
expected that there is no significant or better relationship between the executive’s individual
education and the performance of REITs.
**Insert Figure 2 about here**
Except for the executive’s individual education, this paper also focuses on the joint
education of the executive team. As two of the most important executives in the top executive
13
team, this paper first views CEO and CFO as an executive team, and divides the executive team
of CEO and CFO into three categories, based on the different combinations of executive’s
individual education, to analyze the relationship between the joint education of executive team of
CEO and CFO and the performance of REITs. Figure 2 shows the education of executive team of
CEO and CFO and the average quarterly performance of 288 U.S. REITs in each year from 2000
to 2018.
Same with Figure 1, the lines in yellow, blue and green also represent the average value of
quarterly performance of REITs, measured by Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE, of all companies in
each year, respectively.
As for the education of executive team of CEO and CFO, the bars in blue, called “CEO
Leadership”, represent the proportion of the executive team of CEO and CFO in which CEO has
no Top 20 school education and CFO has Top 20 school education in each year, as mentioned
above, “CEO Leadership” comprehensively displays the leadership skill for a CEO, as a CEO
with lower education leads executives with high education. The bars in orange, called “Team
Top 20”, represent the proportion of the executive team of CEO and CFO in which both CEO
and CFO have Top 20 school education in each year, “Team Top 20” effectively shows the
high-educated cooperation among executives in the executive team, as a CEO with high
education leads executives with similar high education. The bars in gray, called “Dominant
CEO”, represent the proportion of the executive team of CEO and CFO in which CEO has Top
20 school education and CFO has no Top 20 school education in each year, “Dominant CEO”
directly shows the CEO’s dominant role in the executive team, as a CEO with high education
leads executives with lower education.
As for the trends of the proportions of the executive team of CEO and CFO, the proportion
of “CEO Leadership”, with the value range from 0.03 to 0.12, is in a steady increase state during
the whole period, and the increase is more significant after 2012. The proportion of “Team Top
20”, with the value range from 0.04 to 0.06, changes very little during this period. It increases
slightly from 2000 to 2005, after 2005, it declines significantly and reaches to its lowest value in
2011, then, it increases very slightly and almost remains at a horizontal level.
The proportion of “Dominant CEO”, with the value range from 0.11 to 0.25, increases
slightly from 2000 to 2006, and slightly decreases and remain in a stable state during 2007 to
2009, and then, increases slightly from 2010 to 2015, and after 2015, it decreases significantly.
The proportion of “Dominant CEO” is always the highest during the whole period, and then,
the proportion of “CEO Leadership”, and the proportion of “Team Top 20” is always the lowest.
However, comparing with the increasing trends of the average quarterly performance of REITs,
as the average value of ROA and ROE increase from 2012 to 2018, the proportion of “CEO
Leadership” shows a similar significantly increasing trend, while the proportions of “Team Top
20” and “Dominant CEO” show inconsistent slightly decreasing or stable trends. As shown in
Figure 2, it implies that although “Dominant CEO” always has the highest proportion among the
three kinds of executive teams of CEO and CFO, “CEO Leadership” shows its increasing
important role in the establishment of executive team, especially after 2012. Therefore, it can be
expected that, comparing with the executive team of “Team Top 20” and “Dominant CEO”, the
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education of executive team of “CEO Leadership” has positive impact on performance of REITs.
Specifically, comparing with the executive teams of “Team Top 20” and “Dominant CEO”
which show the high-educated cooperation among executives with similar high education in the
executive team and CEO’s dominant role in the executive team, respectively, the education of
executive team of “CEO Leadership” which comprehensively displays the leadership skill for
CEO is expected to positively affect the performance of REITs.
In summary, Figure 2 shows the relationship between the education of executive team of
CEO and CFO and the performance of REITs, as shown in Figure 2, it can be expected that there
is a positive relationship between the education of executive team of CEO and CFO in which
CEO has no high education and CFO has high education and the performance of REITs.
As shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, the proportions of “Top 20 CEO” and “Dominant CEO”
are always the highest among the different groups in the charts. However, comparing with the
increasing trend of the average quarterly performance of REITs, especially after 2012, the
proportions of “Top 20 CEO”, “Top 20 CFO”, “Dominant CEO” and “Team Top 20” show
inconsistently or slightly consistent trends with that of the average quarterly performance of
REITs, while the proportion of “CEO Leadership” shows significantly consistent steady
increasing trend.
As for some views of point about the overconfidence and REITs company performance
from some studies, Mishra and Metilda (2015) find that the overconfidence increases with the
level of education. In addition, Eichholtz and onder (2014) find that REITs with overconfident
CEOs tend to invest more and show lower property investment performance. Therefore, it may
imply that the board of directors not only focuses on the high individual ability that executives
with high education may have, but also considers whether the executives’ management styles
and cooperation of executives can improve the company performance. In addition, especially
after the period of financial crisis, the board of directors tends to hire executives with more
cautious management style.
In summary, Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the executive’s education at an executive
individual level and an executive team level of CEO and CFO, respectively. As shown in Figure
1, it can be expected that there is no significant or better relationship between executive’s
individual education and the performance of REITs. Meanwhile, as for the similar increasing
trends between “CEO Leadership” and the average quarterly performance of REITs shown in
Figure 2, it can be expected that there is a positive relationship between the education of
executive team of CEO and CFO in which CEO has no high education and CFO has high
education and the performance of REITs. Therefore, there are Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2:
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Hypothesis 1:
There is no significant or better relationship between executive’s individual education and the
performance of REITs.
Hypothesis 2:
As considering the executive team of CEO and CFO, there is significantly positive relationship
between the education of executive team of CEO and CFO in which CEO has no high
education and CFO has high education and the performance of REITs.
**Insert Figure 3 about here**
Except for the CEO and CFO, this paper also focuses on another important top executive in
the executive team, that is, COO. As a robustness test, this paper analyses the relationship
between the joint education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO and the performance of
REITs. Figure 3 shows the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO and the average
quarterly performance of 288 U.S. REITs in each year from 2000 to 2018.
Specifically, regardless of CEO’s individual education, the bars in blue, orange and gray,
called “Count Value=0”, “Count Value=1” and “Count Value=2”, represent the proportions of
subsets of CFO and COO in which there is zero, one and two of CFO and COO with Top 20
school education, respectively.
Same with Figure 1 and Figure 2, the lines in yellow, blue and green also represent the
average value of quarterly performance of REITs, measured by Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE, of all
companies in each year, respectively.
As shown in this chart, the proportion of “Count Value=0”, with the value range from 0.74
to 0.87, is in a state of steady and slightly decline during the whole period. In addition, both the
proportions of “Count Value=1”, with the value range from 0.12 to 0.23, and “Count Value=2”,
with the value range from 0.002 to 0.04, increase steady and slightly during the whole period.
Although the proportions of “Count Value=1” and “Count Value=2” are always lower than
that of “Count Value=0”, they show similar increasing trends to that of the average quarterly
performance of REITs, especially after 2012. It indicates that the high education of CFO and
COO play a more important role in the executive team. The inconsistent trends between the
proportion of “Count Value=0” and the average performance of REITs also indicates the
insignificant relationship between executive’s individual education and the performance of
REITs.
In summary, regardless of CEO’s individual education, Figure 3 shows the relationship
between the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO and the performance of REITs.
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As shown in Figure 3, similar to Figure 1, it can be expected that there is no significant or better
relationship between executive’s individual education and the performance of REITs. In addition,
as considering the executive team of CEO, CFO and COO, regardless of CEO’s individual
education, as for the similar increasing trends between the proportion of “Count Value=1” and
the average quarterly performance of REITs, and also between the proportion of “Count Value=2”
and the average quarterly performance of REITs, especially after 2012, it can be expected that
there is a positive relationship between the education of the executive team of CEO, CFO and
COO in which at least one of CFO and COO has Top 20 school education and the performance
of REITs. For a more comprehensive and accurate analysis, this paper employs the Figure 4 in
the following with a stricter criterion of CEO’s individual education.
**Insert Figure 4 about here**
As shown in Figure 2, it can be expected that there is positive relationship between the
education of executive team of CEO and CFO in which CEO has no Top 20 school education
and CFO has Top 20 school education and the performance of REITs, and as shown in Figure 3,
it can be expected that there is positive relationship between the education of executive team of
CEO, CFO and COO in which, regardless CEO’s individual education, at least one of CFO and
COO has Top 20 school education, and the performance of REITs. Since both Figure 2 and
Figure 3 show no significantly positive impact of CEO’s high individual education on the
performance of REITs, for a more comprehensive and accurate analysis, similar to the analysis
of the impact of the education of executive team of CEO and CFO on performance of REITs, this
paper divides the executive team of CEO, CFO and COO into three categories, based on the
different combinations of executive’s individual education, to analyze the relationship between
the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO and the performance of REITs. In
Figure 4, it shows the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO and the average
quarterly performance of 288 U.S. REITs in each year from 2000 to 2018, assuming that CEO in
executive team has no Top 20 school education.
Same with Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3, the lines in yellow, blue and green also
represent the average value of quarterly performance of REITs, measured by Tobin’s Q, ROA
and ROE, of all companies in each year, respectively.
As shown in Figure 4, as assuming that CEO in the executive team has no Top 20 school
education, the bars in blue, orange, and grey, called “Count Value=1”, “Count Value=2” and
“Count Value>0” represent the proportions of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in which
there is one, two, and at least one of CFO and COO with Top 20 school education, respectively.
In general, as for “Count Value=1”, with the value range from 0.07 to 0.14, “Count
Value=2”, with the value range from 0 to 0.03, and “Count Value>0”, with the value range from
0.07 to 0.15, all of these three groups show steady or increasing trends during the period, which
are similar to that of the average quarterly performance of REITs.
In summary, as assuming that CEO in the executive team has no Top 20 school education,
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Figure 4 shows the relationship between the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO
and the performance of REITs. As shown in Figure 4, as for the similar increasing trends
between the proportions of “Count Value=1”, “Count Value=2” and “Count Value>0” and the
average quarterly performance of REITs, respectively, it can be expected that, as assuming that
CEO in the executive team has no Top 20 school education, there is a positive relationship
between the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in which at least one of CFO
and COO has Top 20 school education and the performance of REITs. Therefore, based on
Figure 3 and 4, there is Hypothesis 3:
Hypothesis 3:
As considering executive team of CEO, CFO and COO, there is a significantly positive
relationship between the education of the executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in which
CEO has no high education and at least one of CFO and COO has high education and the
performance of REITs.
In this part, this paper simply and directly analyses the relationship between executive’s
education and the performance of REITs at an executive individual level and an executive team
level, respectively. In the following, based on the Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3,
this paper empirically examines the relationship between executive’s education and the
performance of REITs at an executive individual level and an executive team level, respectively,
and tries to find the best executive team of which the combination of executive’s education has
greater positive impact on performance of REITs.
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4. Data and Method
4.1 Data
4.1.1 Data Resources
For analyzing the relationship between executive’s education and the performance of REITs,
this paper uses two parts of U.S. REITs data. First, this paper collects the employment and
education data of top executives, including CEO, CFO and COO, of all the U.S. REITs
companies from the database of BoardEx of WRDS. Second, this paper also collects the
quarterly financial performance data of all the U.S. REITs companies from the database of S&P
Global, formerly known as SNL Financial. The period of these two parts of data is from 2000 to
2018.
To be specific, as for the data of the education of top executives of U.S. REITs, it includes
the ranking of all the schools attended by the executive that is considered as the measure of
executive’s education. In addition, as for the data of quarterly financial performance of U.S.
REITs, it includes quarterly ROA (Return on Asset), quarterly ROE (Return on Equity), and
other quarterly financial performance measures, such as quarterly assets, quarterly value of
common equity, quarterly value of debt, quarterly cash flow, etc.
As for the data processing, this paper combines the data of employment and education of
top executives of REITs and the data of quarterly financial performance of REITs by using SNL
Key Number of REITs, and then keeps all the REITs of which the data of employment and
education of top executives, at least CEO, and also the data of quarterly financial performance of
REITs are available for each quarter during 2000 and 2018. In the final data, there are totally 288
U.S. REITs and 19730 observations in sample.
4.1.2 Variables Description
Based on the analysis ideas and hypotheses mentioned above, this paper establishes
variables as follows for the models of empirical analysis.
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4.1.2.1 Measures of Executive’s Employment and Education
Executive’s Employment
As for the measures of top executive’s employment, this paper arranges the executive’s
tenure into quarterly format.
Executive’s Education
As for the measures of top executive’s education, this paper processes the data of
executive’s education as follows. First, as for executive’s individual education, this paper selects
the school with the highest ranking among all the schools that the executive attends to, as the
executive’s individual education. Second, since this paper examines the impact of executive’s
education on performance of REITs at an executive individual level and an executive team level,
after determining the executive’s individual education, as follows, this paper establishes several
dummies for the measures of executive’s education at an executive individual level and an
executive team level.
(1). Measures of Executive’s Individual Education
As for the examination of the relationship between executive’s individual education and the
performance of REITs, this paper establishes a dummy for CEOs and CFOs who graduate from
Top 20 schools, respectively. The dummy of executive’s individual education, which are called
“CEO Top 20” and “CFO Top 20”, equal to one if the executive has Top 20 school education.
(2). Measures of Education of Executive Team
As for the examination of the relationship between the education of executive team and the
performance of REITs, as follows, this paper establishes several measures for the education of
the executive team of CEO and CFO, and the education of the executive team of CEO, CFO and
COO, respectively.
Measures of Education of Executive Team of CEO and CFO
As for the examination of the relationship between the education of executive team of CEO
and CFO and the performance of REITs, this paper establishes three dummies for three kinds of
executive teams with different combinations of individual education of CEO and CFO.
Specifically, first, the dummy of “Team Top 20” represents the executive team of CEO and CFO
in which both CEO and CFO have Top 20 school education. Second, the dummy of “Dominant
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CEO” represents the executive team of CEO and CFO in which CEO has Top 20 school
education and CFO has no Top 20 school education. Third, the dummy of “CEO Leadership”
represents the executive team of CEO and CFO in which CEO has no Top 20 school education
and CFO has Top 20 school education.
Measures of Education of Executive Team of CEO, CFO and COO
As for the examination of the relationship between the education of executive team of CEO,
CFO and COO and the performance of REITs, this paper establishes several dummies for several
kinds of executive teams with different combinations of individual education of CEO, CFO and
COO, respectively, for two examinations that use different criteria of CEO’s individual
education.
First, as for the general examination that examines the relationship between the education of
the executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in which, regardless of CEO’s individual education,
there is zero, one or two of CFO and COO with Top 20 school education and the performance of
REITs, this paper establishes a dummy of “Executives Top 20” for the education of executive
team of CEO, CFO and COO. “Executives Top 20” equals to zero, one and two if there is zero,
one and two of CFO and COO with Top 20 school education, in other words, it represents the
number of executives of CFO and COO in the executive team with Top 20 school education.
Second, as for the examination that examines the relationship between the education of the
executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in which, assuming that CEO in the executive team has
no Top 20 school education, there is one, two and at least one of CFO and COO with Top 20
school education and performance of REITs, this paper establishes the dummy of “Team Count”
to represent the number of executives of CFO and COO in the executive team with Top 20
school education. Specifically, “Team Count_1” equals to one if there is one executive of CFO
and COO with Top 20 school education, “Team Count_2” equals to one if both CFO and COO in
executive team have Top 20 school education, “Team Count_12” equals to one if at least one of
CFO and COO in executive team has Top 20 school education.
4.1.2.2 Measures of performance of REITs
As for measuring the performance of REITs, this paper uses ROA (Return on Assets), ROE
(Return on Equity) and Tobin’s Q as the measures of performance of REITs. Specifically,
Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of common equity plus total assets minus the book
value of common equity, divided by company’s total assets.
21
4.1.2.3 Financial Control Variables
This paper also considers several financial control variables, including the ratio of cash to
total assets, called “Cash Holdings”, the ratio of debt to total assets, called “Debt”, and the
natural logarithm of total assets, using for controlling the firm size of REITs, called “Assets”,
and also including ROE (Return on Equity), using for controlling the financial performance of
REITs, called “Profitability”. All of the financial control variables are lagged since the level of
these financial control variables in previous quarter may affect the performance of REITs in next
quarter.
4.1.3 Statistical Description
**Insert Table 1 about here**
As shown in Table 1, Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of executive’s education
variables. As shown in Panel A, as for executive’s individual education, it can be seen that, there
are about 23% CEOs in U.S. REITs in sample have Top 20 school education, while about 12%
CFOs in U.S. REITs in sample have Top 20 school education.
As for the education of the executive team of CEO and CFO, there are about 5% executive
teams in which both CEO and CFO have Top 20 school education, and about 18% executive
teams in which CEO has Top 20 school education and CFO has no Top 20 school education, and
about 7% executive teams in which CEO has no Top 20 school education and CFO has Top 20
school education.
In addition, as for the education of the executive team of CEO, CFO and COO, first,
regardless of CEO’s individual education, there may be zero, one or two of CFO and COO in the
executive team with Top 20 school education, in other words, the value of “Executives Top 20”
is zero, one or two, shown as “Count Value”. Table 2 shows the proportions of each value of
“Executives Top 20”.
**Insert Table 2 about here**
As shown in Table 2, as for the executive team of CEO, CFO and COO, regardless of
CEO’s individual education, there are about 80% executive teams in which both CFO and COO
have no Top 20 school education, about 18% executive teams in which one of CFO and COO
has Top 20 school education, and about 2% executive teams in which both CFO and COO have
Top 20 school education.
Second, as assuming that CEO in the executive team has no Top 20 school education, it can
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be seen from the variables of “Team Count_1”, “Team Count_2” and “Team Count_12” shown
in Table 1, there are about 11% executive teams in which one of CFO and COO has Top 20
school education, about 1% executive teams in which both CFO and COO have Top 20 school
education, and about 12% executive teams in which at least one of CFO and COO has Top 20
school education.
Panel B shows the descriptive statistics of the financial performance variables of U.S.
REITs. As shown in Panel B, the mean of quarterly Tobin’s Q of U.S. REITs in sample during
2000 and 2018 is 1.48, with the value range from 0.34 to 35.49. As alternative financial
performance indicators, the mean of quarterly ROA (Return on Assets) of U.S. REITs in sample
during 2000 and 2018 is 2.59, with the value range from -397.53 to 322.40, and the mean of
quarterly ROE (Return on Equity) of U.S. REITs in sample during 2000 and 2018 is 6.44, with
the value range from -905.31 to 945.77.
Panel C shows the descriptive statistics of financial control variables for controlling the firm
size and financial performance of U.S. REITs. The financial control variables, including the ratio
of cash to total assets, called “Cash Holdings”, the ratio of debt to total assets, called “Debt”, the
natural logarithm of total assets, called “Assets”, also including ROE (Return on Equity), called
“Profitability”.
As shown in Panel C, the mean value of the lagged ratio of cash to total assets (“Cash
Holdings”) is 0.05, the mean value of the lagged ratio of debt to total assets (“Debt”) is 0.50, the
mean value of the lagged natural logarithm of total assets (“Assets”) is 14.42, and the mean value
of lagged ROE (Return on Equity, “Profitability”) is 6.43.
4.2 Method
As for the analysis ideas mentioned above, there are two parts of empirical examinations of
the relationship between executive’s education and the performance of REITs.
First, as for the first part of empirical examination, the examination of the relationship
between executive’s individual education and the performance of REITs, based on Hypothesis 1,
it is expected that there is no significant or better relationship between executive’s individual
education and the performance of REITs.
Second, as for the second part of empirical examination, the examination of the relationship
between the education of executive team and the performance of REITs, based on Hypothesis 2
and Hypothesis 3, it is expected that the joint education of executive team significantly affects
the performance of REITs. Specifically, as considering the executive team of CEO and CFO, it is
expected that there is significantly positive relationship between the education of executive team
of CEO and CFO in which CEO has no high education and CFO has high education and the
performance of REITs. Moreover, as considering executive team of CEO, CFO and COO, it is
expected that there is a significantly positive relationship between the education of the executive
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team of CEO, CFO and COO in which CEO has no Top 20 school education and at least one of
CFO and COO has Top 20 school education and the performance of REITs.
4.2.1 Examination of the Relationship between Executive’s Individual Education and the
Performance of REITs
As for the first part of empirical examination, this paper examines the relationship between
executive’s individual education and the performance of REITs by applying an OLS (Ordinary
Least Squares) model.
There are two models, Model 1 and Model 2, which examine the relationships between
CEO’s individual education and the performance of REITs, and the relationship between CFO’s
individual education and the performance of REITs, respectively. These two models are with the
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity, clustered by the firm, and also absorbs the fixed
effects of each quarter of the whole period and the property type. Model 1 and Model 2 are
shown as follows:
Model 1
 E怀 썐怀  mE =   +  1 ∗  in  썐n 20 +  2 ∗   nℎ  썐ngs fn +  3 ∗  in  썐n 20 ∗   nℎ  썐ngs fn +  4
∗  nnEsn +  5 ∗  E s +  6 ∗  怀썐 ss  snssh +  
Model 2
 E怀 썐怀  mE =   +  1 ∗  in  썐n 20 +  2 ∗   nℎ  썐ngs fn +  3 ∗  in  썐n 20 ∗   nℎ  썐ngs fn +  4
∗  nnEsn +  5 ∗  E s +  6 ∗  怀썐 ss  snssh +  
In Model 1, Performance of REITs, as the dependent variable, is measured by Tobin’s Q,
ROA (Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on Equity). “CEO Top 20” is the CEO’s individual
education dummy which equals to one if the CEO has Top 20 school education, otherwise, zero.
“Cash Holdings”, which is calculated as the ratio of cash to total assets, is the discretionary cash
for REITs. This paper introduces “Cash Holdings” into the models because the discretionary
cash is expected to significantly affect the performance of REITs, and the impact of executive’s
education on performance of REITs is likely to be sensitive to the available cash.
There is also an interactive term of “CEO Top 20” and “Cash Holdings”. Eichholtz and
onder (2014) who focus on the impact of manager’s overconfidence on company performance
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empirically examine the impact of cash and the impact of the interactive term of overconfidence
and cash on performance of REITs, respectively, and find that REITs with overconfident CEOs
tend to invest more, acquire more assets and are less likely to sell assets than their counterparts,
if CEOs have enough discretionary cash. In other words, they find that the discretionary cash
significantly affects the company performance by influencing manager’s investment behavior.
Therefore, this paper considers that “Cash Holdings”, as the discretionary cash of REITs, may be
one of the factors that affect the performance of REITs by influencing the business
decision-making of executives with different management styles. By establishing this interactive
term of “CEO Top 20” and “Cash Holdings”, this paper examines the impact of CEO’s
individual education on performance of REITs, if CEO has enough discretionary cash, in other
words, the interactive term of “CEO Top 20” and “Cash Holdings” can isolate the impact of
CEO’s individual education on performance of REITs, if there is enough discretionary cash.
As for the financial control variables in Model 1, it includes “Assets”, which is calculated as
the natural logarithm of total assets, “Debt”, which is calculated as the ratio of debt to total assets,
and “Profitability”, which is the quarterly ROE (Return on Equity) of REITs. All the financial
control variables are lagged.
In Model 2, Performance of REITs, as the dependent variable, is measured by Tobin’s Q,
ROA (Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on Equity). “CFO Top 20” is the CFO’s individual
education dummy which equals to one if the CFO has Top 20 school education, otherwise, zero.
“Cash Holdings” is also calculated as the ratio of cash to total assets. Similar to Model 1, the
interactive term of “CFO Top 20” and “Cash Holdings” is used to examine the impact of CFO’s
individual education on performance of REITs, if there is enough discretionary cash.
The financial control variables in Model 2, including “Assets”, the natural logarithm of total
assets, “Debt”, the ratio of debt to total assets, and “Profitability”, which is the quarterly ROE
(Return on Equity) of REITs. All the financial control variables are lagged.
4.2.2 Examination of the Relationship between the Education of Executive Team and the
Performance of REITs
As for the second part of empirical examination, for an improvement of empirical
examination of the relationship between executive’s education and the company performance,
this paper examines the relationship between the education of executive team and the
performance of REITs by applying an OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) model. Specifically, there
is a two-step examination. In the first step, this paper examines the relationship between the
education of executive team of CEO and CFO and the performance of REITs. In the second step,
this paper examines the relationship between the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and
COO and the performance of REITs.
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4.2.2.1 Examination of the Relationship between the Education of Executive Team of CEO
and CFO and the Performance of REITs
In the first step of examination, this paper examines the relationship between the education
of executive team of CEO and CFO and the performance of REITs by focusing on the impact of
different cooperative relationships within executive team based on the different executives’
positions that are affected by different combinations of executive’s individual education on
performance of REITs. Specifically, as mentioned above, this paper views CEO and CFO, two of
the most important executives of the company, as an executive team, and then divides the
executive team of CEO and CFO into three categories, based on the different combinations of
executive’s individual education. First, the executive team of CEO and CFO, which is called
“CEO Leadership”, represents the executive team of CEO and CFO in which CEO has no Top
20 school education and CFO has Top 20 school education. As the executive team of “CEO
Leadership” comprehensively displays the leadership skill for a CEO, as a CEO with lower
education leads executives with high education, this paper examines whether the education of
executive team of CEO and CFO that fully displays the CEO’s leadership skill has significant
impact on performance of REITs. Second, the executive team of CEO and CFO, which is called
“Team Top 20”, represents the executive team of CEO and CFO in which both CEO and CFO
have Top 20 school education. As the executive team of “Team Top 20” effectively shows the
high-educated cooperation among executives in the executive team, as a CEO with high
education leads executives with similar high education, this paper examines whether the
education of executive team of CEO and CFO that effectively shows the high-educated
cooperation among the executives with similar high education has significant impact on
performance of REITs. Third, the executive team of CEO and CFO, which is called “Dominant
CEO”, represents the executive team of CEO and CFO in which CEO has Top 20 school
education and CFO has no Top 20 school education. As the executive team of “Dominant CEO”
directly shows the CEO’s dominant role in the executive team, as a CEO with high education
leads executives with lower education, this paper examines whether the education of executive
team that shows the dominant role of CEO with high education as leading executives with lower
education has significant impact on performance of REITs.
Based on the idea above, there are three models, Model 3, Model 4 and Model 5.
Specifically, Model 3 examines the relationship between the education of executive team of CEO
and CFO in which CEO has no Top 20 school education and CFO has Top 20 school education
and the performance of REITs. Model 4 examines the relationship between the education of
executive team of CEO and CFO in which both CEO and CFO have Top 20 school education
and the performance of REITs. Model 5 examines the relationship between the education of
executive team of CEO and CFO in which CEO has Top 20 school education and CFO has no
Top 20 school education and the performance of REITs. These three models are with the
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity, clustered by the firm, and also absorbs the fixed
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effects of each quarter of the whole period and the property type. Model 3, Model 4 and Model 5
are shown as follows:
Model 3
 E怀 썐怀  mE =   +  1 ∗  in  E gE怀nℎsn +  2 ∗   nℎ  썐ngs fn +  3 ∗  in  E gE怀nℎsn
∗   nℎ  썐ngs fn +  4 ∗  nnEsn +  5 ∗  E s +  6 ∗  怀썐 ss  snssh +  
Model 4
 E怀 썐怀  mE =   +  1 ∗  E   썐n 20 +  2 ∗   nℎ  썐ngs fn +  3 ∗  E   썐n 20 ∗   nℎ  썐ngs fn
+  4 ∗  nnEsn +  5 ∗  E s +  6 ∗  怀썐 ss  snssh +  
Model 5
 E怀 썐怀  mE =   +  1 ∗  썐s   s  in +  2 ∗   nℎ  썐ngs fn +  3 ∗  썐s   s  in
∗   nℎ  썐ngs fn +  4 ∗  nnEsn +  5 ∗  E s +  6 ∗  怀썐 ss  snssh +  
In Model 3, Performance of REITs, as the dependent variable, is measured by Tobin’s Q,
ROA (Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on Equity). “CEO Leadership” is the executive team
education dummy which equals to one if CEO in executive team has no Top 20 school education
and CFO in executive team has Top 20 school education, otherwise, zero. “Cash Holdings” in
Model 3 is also calculated as the ratio of cash to total assets. Similar to Model 1 and Model 2, the
interactive term of “CEO Leadership” and “Cash Holdings” is used to examine the impact of the
education of executive team of CEO and CFO in which CEO has no Top 20 school education
and CFO has Top 20 school education on performance of REITs, if there is enough discretionary
cash.
The financial control variables in Model 3, including “Assets”, the natural logarithm of total
assets, “Debt”, the ratio of debt to total assets, and “Profitability” which is the quarterly ROE
(Return on Equity) of REITs. All the financial control variables are lagged.
In Model 4, Performance of REITs, as the dependent variable, is measured by Tobin’s Q,
ROA (Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on Equity). “Team Top 20” is the executive team
education dummy which equals to one if both CEO and CFO in executive team have Top 20
school education, otherwise, zero. “Cash Holdings” in Model 4 is also calculated as the ratio of
cash to total assets. Similar to Model 3, the interactive term of “Team Top 20” and “Cash
27
Holdings” is used to examine the impact of the education of executive team of CEO and CFO in
which both CEO and CFO have Top 20 school education on performance of REITs, if there is
enough discretionary cash.
The financial control variables in Model 4, including “Assets”, the natural logarithm of total
assets, “Debt”, the ratio of debt to total assets, and “Profitability” which is the quarterly ROE
(Return on Equity) of REITs. All the financial control variables are lagged.
In Model 5, Performance of REITs, as the dependent variable, is measured by Tobin’s Q,
ROA (Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on Equity). “Dominant CEO” is the executive team
education dummy which equals to one if CEO in executive team has Top 20 school education
and CFO in executive team has no Top 20 school education, otherwise, zero. “Cash Holdings” in
Model 5 is also calculated as the ratio of cash to total assets. Similar to Model 3 and Model 4, the
interactive term of “Dominant CEO” and “Cash Holdings” is used to examine the impact of the
education of executive team of CEO and CFO in which CEO has Top 20 school education and
CFO has no Top 20 school education on performance of REITs, if there is enough discretionary
cash.
The financial control variables in Model 5, including “Assets”, the natural logarithm of total
assets, “Debt”, the ratio of debt to total assets, and “Profitability” which is the quarterly ROE
(Return on Equity) of REITs. All the financial control variables are lagged.
4.2.2.2 Examination of the Relationship between the Education of Executive Team of CEO,
CFO and COO and the Performance of REITs
In the second step of examination, for a robustness examination, this paper examines the
relationship between the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO and the
performance of REITs. Specifically, as mentioned above, there are two examinations in the
second step. First, for a more general examination, this paper examines the relationship between
the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in which, regardless of the CEO’s
individual education, there may be zero, one or two of CFO and COO with Top 20 school
education and the performance of REITs. Second, for a more comprehensive and accurate
examination, similar to the examination of the impact of the education of executive team of CEO
and CFO on performance of REITs, this paper also divides the executive team of CEO, CFO and
COO into three categories, based on the different combinations of executive’s individual
education, to examine the relationship between the education of executive team of CEO, CFO
and COO and the performance of REITs. To be specific, by assuming that CEO in the executive
team has no Top 20 school education, this paper examines the relationship between the education
of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in which there is one, two or at least one of CFO and
COO with Top 20 school education and the performance of REITs.
Based on the idea above, there are three models, Model 6, Model 7 and Model 8.
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Specifically, Model 6, as a more general examination, examines the relationship between the
education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in which, regardless of the CEO’s
individual education, there is zero, one or two of CFO and COO with Top 20 school education
and the performance of REITs. For a more comprehensive and accurate examination, as
assuming that CEO in the executive team has no Top 20 school education, Model 7 examines the
relationship between the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in which there is
one or two of CFO and COO with Top 20 school education and the performance of REITs, and
Model 8 examines the relationship between the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and
COO in which there is at least one of CFO and COO with Top 20 school education and the
performance of REITs. These three models are with the standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity, clustered by the firm, and also absorbs the fixed effects of each quarter of the
whole period and the property type. Model 6, Model 7 and Model 8 are shown as follows:
Model 6
 E怀 썐怀  mE =   +  1 ∗  in  썐n 20 +  2 ∗ iiEmssstEn  썐n 20 +  3 ∗   nℎ  썐ngs fn +  4 ∗  nnEsn
+  5 ∗  E s +  6 ∗  怀썐 ss  snssh +  
Model 7
 E怀 썐怀  mE =   +  1 ∗  E   썐s s_1 +  2 ∗  E   썐s s_2 +  3 ∗   nℎ  썐ngs fn +  4 ∗  nnEsn
+  5 ∗  E s +  6 ∗  怀썐 ss  snssh +  
Model 8
 E怀 썐怀  mE =   +  1 ∗  E   썐s s_12 +  2 ∗   nℎ  썐ngs fn +  3 ∗  nnEsn +  4 ∗  E s +  5
∗  怀썐 ss  snssh +  
In Model 6, Performance of REITs, as the dependent variable, is measured by Tobin’s Q,
ROA (Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on Equity). Regardless of the CEO’s individual
education, “Executives Top 20” is the variable of the education of executive team of CEO, CFO
and COO which equals to zero if both CFO and COO in executive team have no Top 20 school
education, or equals to one if there is one of CFO and COO in executive team with Top 20
school education, or equals to two if both CFO and COO in executive team have Top 20 school
education. “CEO Top 20” is the CEO’s individual education dummy which equals to one if the
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CEO has Top 20 school education, otherwise, zero. It is more comprehensive to introduces
“CEO Top 20” since “Executives Top 20” does not focus on CEO’s individual education in
executive team. “Cash Holdings” in Model 6 is also calculated as the ratio of cash to total assets.
The financial control variables in Model 6, including “Assets”, the natural logarithm of total
assets, “Debt”, the ratio of debt to total assets, and “Profitability” which is the quarterly ROE
(Return on Equity) of REITs. All the financial controls are lagged.
In Model 7, Performance of REITs, as the dependent variable, is measured by Tobin’s Q,
ROA (Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on Equity). As for the dummy variables of the
education of the executive team of CEO, CFO and COO, as assuming that CEO in the executive
team has no Top 20 school education, “Team Count_1” is the executive team education dummy
which equals to one if there is one of CFO or COO in executive team with Top 20 school
education, otherwise, zero. “Team Count_2” is the executive team education dummy which
equals to one if both CFO or COO in executive team have Top 20 school education, otherwise,
zero. “Cash Holdings” in Model 7 is also calculated as the ratio of cash to total assets.
The financial control variables in Model 7, including “Assets”, the natural logarithm of total
assets, “Debt”, the ratio of debt to total assets, and “Profitability” which is the quarterly ROE
(Return on Equity) of REITs. All the financial controls are lagged.
In Model 8, Performance of REITs, as the dependent variable, is measured by Tobin’s Q,
ROA (Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on Equity). As for the dummy variables of the
education of the executive team of CEO, CFO and COO, as assuming that CEO in the executive
team has no Top 20 school education, “Team Count_12” is the executive team education dummy
which equals to one if there is at least one of CFO and COO in executive team with Top 20
school education, otherwise, zero. “Cash Holdings” in Model 8 is also calculated as the ratio of
cash to total assets.
The financial control variables in Model 8, including “Assets”, the natural logarithm of total
assets, “Debt”, the ratio of debt to total assets, and “Profitability” which is the quarterly ROE
(Return on Equity) of REITs. All the financial controls are lagged.
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5. Results of Empirical Examinations
5.1 Results of the Examination of the Relationship between Executive’s Individual
Education and the Performance of REITs
Table 3 and Table 4 show the results of Model 1 and Model 2 that examine the relationship
between executive’s individual education and the performance of REITs.
**Insert Table 3 about here**
Regression (1) to Regression (6) in Table 3 show the results of the examination of the
relationship between CEO’s individual education and the performance of REITs.
As shown in Table 3, as for all regressions, there is no significant coefficient of “CEO Top
20” for all the three measures of the financial performance of REITs, that are, Tobin’s Q, ROA
(Return on Assets), and ROE (Return on Equity). It suggests that there is no significant
relationship between CEO’s individual education and the financial performance of REITs.
In regression (1) and regression (2), as for “Cash Holdings”, it shows that there is a
significantly positive relationship between the lagged cash-to-assets ratio and the financial
performance of REITs, as measured by Tobin’s Q, specifically, a 1% increase in cash-to-assets
ratio leads to a 1.38%-2.37% increase in the financial performance of REITs, as measured by
Tobin’s Q.
As for regression (2), regression (4) and regression (6), as considering the interactive term
of “CEO Top 20” and “Cash Holdings” in Model 1, it shows that there is a significantly negative
relationship between the interactive term of “CEO Top 20” and “Cash Holdings” and the
financial performance of REITs, as measuring the financial performance of REITs by Tobin’s Q
and ROE (Return on Equity). It suggests that, if there is enough discretionary cash, there is a
significantly negative impact of CEO’s individual Top 20 school education on financial
performance of REITs.
As for the control variables for the financial performance of REITs, there is a significantly
positive impact of “Assets” on financial performance of REITs, measured by ROE (Return on
Equity), a 1% increase in lagged natural logarithm of assets leads to a 1.35%-1.39% increase in
ROE (Return on Equity). There is a significantly negative relationship between “Debt” and the
financial performance of REITs, measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA (Return on Assets), a 1%
increase in lagged debt-to-assets ratio leads to a 0.289% to 0.295% decrease in Tobin’s Q, and a
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6.769% to 6.832% decrease in ROA (Return on Assets). As a proxy of profitability, it shows that
there is a significantly positive relationship between lagged ROE (Return on Equity) and the
financial performance of REITs, suggests that the ROE in previous quarter, that is, the
profitability of previous quarter, has significantly positive impact on financial performance of
REITs in next quarter, specifically, a 1% increase in the lagged ROE leads to a 0.002% increase
in Tobin’s Q, a 0.025% increase in ROA and a 0.3% increase in ROE.
In summary, Table 3 presents the results of OLS regressions of Model 1 that examines the
relationship between CEO’s individual education and the performance of REITs. In the result, it
shows that, first, there is no significant relationship between CEO’s individual education and the
performance of REITs. Second, if there is enough discretionary cash, there is a significantly
negative impact of CEO’s individual Top 20 school education on financial performance of
REITs.
**Insert Table 4 about here**
Regression (1) to Regression (6) in Table 4 show the results of the examination of the
relationship between CFO’s individual education and the performance of REITs.
As shown in Table 4, as for regressions (2), regression (5) and regression (6), there are
significant coefficients of “CFO Top 20” for the financial performance of REITs, as measured by
Tobin’s Q and ROE (Return on Equity).
However, as for regression (2), regression (4) and regression (6), as considering the
interactive term of “CFO Top 20” and “Cash Holdings” in Model 2, it shows that there is a
significant negative relationship between the interactive term of “CFO Top 20” and “Cash
Holdings” and the financial performance of REITs, as measuring the financial performance of
REITs by Tobin’s Q and ROE (Return on Equity). It suggests that although CFO’s individual
education shows significantly positive impact on financial performance of REITs, as measured
by Tobin’s Q and ROE (Return on Equity), if there is enough discretionary cash, there is a
significantly negative impact of CFO’s individual Top 20 school education on financial
performance of REITs.
In regression (1) and regression (2), as for “Cash Holdings”, it shows that there is a
significantly positive relationship between the lagged cash-to-assets ratio and the financial
performance of REITs, as measured by Tobin’s Q, specifically, a 1% increase in cash-to-assets
ratio leads to a 1.37%-1.77% increase in the financial performance of REITs, as measured by
Tobin’s Q.
As for the control variables for the financial performance of REITs, there is a significantly
positive impact of “Assets” on financial performance of REITs, as measured by ROE (Return on
Equity), a 1% increase in lagged natural logarithm of assets leads to a 1.25%-1.29% increase in
ROE (Return on Equity). There is a significantly negative relationship between “Debt” and the
financial performance of REITs, as measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA (Return on Assets), a 1%
increase in lagged debt-to-assets ratio leads to a 0.280% to 0.291% decrease in Tobin’s Q, and a
6.796% to 6.839% decrease in ROA (Return on Assets). As a proxy of profitability, it shows that
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there is a significantly positive relationship between lagged ROE (Return on Equity) and the
financial performance of REITs, suggests that the ROE in previous quarter, that is, the
profitability of previous quarter, has significantly positive impact on financial performance of
REITs in next quarter, specifically, a 1% increase in the lagged ROE leads to a 0.002% increase
in Tobin’s Q, a 0.025% increase in ROA and a 0.3% increase in ROE.
In summary, Table 4 presents the results of OLS regressions of Model 2 that examines the
relationship between CFO’s individual education and the performance of REITs. In the result, it
shows that, although there is slightly significantly positive relationship between CFO’s
individual education and the financial performance of REITs, as measured by Tobin’s Q and
ROE, however, if there is enough discretionary cash, there is a significantly negative impact of
CFO’s individual Top 20 school education on financial performance of REITs.
As for Table 3 and Table 4, Model 1 and Model 2 examine the relationship between
executive’s individual education and the performance of REITs, as for the results of Model 1 and
Model 2 that are consistent with Hypothesis 1, there is no significant or better relationship
between executive’s individual education and the performance of REITs, and if there is enough
discretionary cash, executive’s high individual education significantly negatively affects the
performance of REITs.
5.2 Results of the Examination of the Relationship between the Education of Executive
Team and the Performance of REITs
In the second part of empirical examination that examines the relationship between the
education of executive team and the performance of REITs, there is a two-step examination. In
the first step, this paper examines the relationship between the education of executive team of
CEO and CFO and the performance of REITs. In the second step, it examines the relationship
between the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO and the performance of REITs.
5.2.1 Results of the Examination of the Relationship between the Education of Executive
Team of CEO and CFO and the Performance of REITs
Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7 show the results of Model 3, Model 4, and Model 5 that
examine the relationship between the education of executive team of CEO and CFO and the
performance of REITs.
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**Insert Table 5 about here**
Regression (1) to Regression (6) in Table 5 show the results of the examination of the
relationship between the education of executive team of CEO and CFO in which CEO has no
Top 20 school education and CFO has Top 20 school education and the performance of REITs.
As shown in Table 5, as for all the regressions of Model 3, there are significant coefficients
of “CEO Leadership” for the financial performance of REITs, as measured by Tobin’s Q, ROA
(Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on Equity). It implies that there is a significantly positive
impact of the education of executive team of CEO and CFO in which CEO has no Top 20 school
education and CFO has Top 20 school education on financial performance of REITs.
As for regression (2), regression (4) and regression (6), as considering the interactive term
between “CEO Leadership” and “Cash Holdings” in Model 3, it shows that there is no significant
relationship between the interactive term of “CEO Leadership” and “Cash Holdings” and the
financial performance of REITs.
In regression (1) and regression (2), as for “Cash Holdings”, it shows that there is a
significantly positive relationship between lagged cash-to-assets ratio and the financial
performance of REITs, as measured by Tobin’s Q, a 1% increase in cash-to-assets ratio leads to a
1.8%-1.96% increase in the financial performance of REITs, measured by Tobin’s Q.
As for the control variables for the financial performance of REITs, there is a significantly
positive impact of “Assets” on financial performance of REITs, as measured by all three
financial performance indicators, Tobin’s Q, ROA (Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on
Equity), a 1% increase in lagged natural logarithm of assets leads to a 0.06% increase in Tobin’
Q, a 0.5% increase in ROA (Return on Assets), and a 2.3% increase in ROE (Return on Equity).
There is a significantly negative relationship between “Debt” and the financial performance of
REITs, as measured by ROA (Return on Assets), a 1% increase in lagged debt-to-assets ratio
leads to a 4.25% to 4.27% decrease in ROA (Return on Assets). As a proxy of profitability, it
shows that there is a significantly positive relationship between lagged ROE (Return on Equity)
and the financial performance of REITs, suggests that the ROE in previous quarter, that is, the
profitability of previous quarter, has significantly positive impact on financial performance of
REITs in next quarter, specifically, a 1% increase in the lagged ROE leads to a 0.002% increase
in Tobin’s Q, a 0.02% increase in ROA and a 0.37% increase in ROE.
In summary, Table 5 presents the results of OLS regressions of Model 3 that examines the
relationship between the education of executive team of CEO and CFO in which CEO has no
Top 20 school education and CFO has Top 20 school education and the performance of REITs.
In the result, it shows that, there is significantly positive relationship between the education of
executive team of CEO and CFO in which CEO has no Top 20 school education and CFO has
Top 20 school education and the financial performance of REITs, as measured by Tobin’s Q,
ROA and ROE, and there is no significant impact of the interactive term of “CEO Leadership”
and “Cash Holdings” on financial performance of REITs. It indicates that the education of
executive team of “CEO Leadership” that fully displays the leadership skill for the CEO with
lower education as leading executives with high education has significantly positive impact on
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performance of REITs.
**Insert Table 6 about here**
Regression (1) to Regression (6) in Table 6 show the results of the examination of the
relationship between the education of executive team of CEO and CFO in which both CEO and
CFO have Top 20 school education and the performance of REITs.
As shown in Table 6, as for all the regressions of Model 4, there is no significant coefficient
of “Team Top 20” for the financial performance of REITs, as measured by Tobin’s Q, ROA
(Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on Equity). It implies that there is no significantly impact
of the education of executive team of CEO and CFO in which both CEO and CFO have Top 20
school education on financial performance of REITs.
However, as for regression (2), regression (4) and regression (6), as considering the
interactive term of “Team Top 20” and “Cash Holdings” in Model 4, it shows that there is a
significantly negative relationship between the interactive term of “Team Top 20” and “Cash
Holdings” and the financial performance of REITs, as measured by Tobin’s Q, suggests that
there is a significantly negative impact of the education of executive team of CEO and CFO in
which both CEO and CFO have Top 20 school education on financial performance of REITs, if
there is enough discretionary cash.
In regression (1) and regression (2), as for “Cash Holdings”, it shows that there is a
significantly positive relationship between lagged cash-to-assets ratio and the financial
performance of REITs, as measured by Tobin’s Q, a 1% increase in cash-to-assets ratio leads to a
1.8%-2.1% increase in the financial performance of REITs, measured by Tobin’s Q.
As for the control variables for the financial performance of REITs, there is a significantly
positive impact of “Assets” on financial performance of REITs, as measured by all three
financial performance indicators, Tobin’s Q, ROA (Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on
Equity), a 1% increase in lagged natural logarithm of assets leads to a 0.067%-0.068% increase
in Tobin’ Q, a 0.537%-0.541% increase in ROA (Return on Assets), and a 2.353%-2.368%
increase in ROE (Return on Equity). There is a significantly negative relationship between “Debt”
and the financial performance of REITs, as measured by ROA (Return on Assets), a 1% increase
in lagged debt-to-assets ratio leads to a 4.213% to 4.238% decrease in ROA (Return on Assets).
As a proxy of profitability, it shows that there is a significantly positive relationship between
lagged ROE (Return on Equity) and the financial performance of REITs, suggests that the ROE
in previous quarter, that is, the profitability of previous quarter, has significantly positive impact
on financial performance of REITs in next quarter, specifically, a 1% increase in the lagged ROE
leads to a 0.002% increase in Tobin’s Q, a 0.023% increase in ROA and a 0.37% increase in
ROE.
In summary, Table 6 presents the results of OLS regressions of Model 4 that examines the
relationship between the education of executive team of CEO and CFO in which both CEO and
CFO have Top 20 school education and the performance of REITs. In the result, it shows that,
there is no significant relationship between the education of executive team of CEO and CFO in
which both CEO and CFO have Top 20 school education and the financial performance of
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REITs, as measured by Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE, and if there is enough discretionary cash,
there is a significantly negative impact of the education of executive team of CEO and CFO in
which both CEO and CFO have Top 20 school education on financial performance of REITs. It
indicates that the education of executive team of “Team Top 20” that effectively shows the
high-educated cooperation among the executives with similar high education has no significant
impact on performance of REITs, however, the high-educated cooperation among the executives
with high education significantly negatively affects the performance of REITs, if there is enough
discretionary cash.
**Insert Table 7 about here**
Regression (1) to Regression (6) in Table 7 show the results of the examination of the
relationship between the education of executive team of CEO and CFO in which CEO has Top
20 school education and CFO has no Top 20 school education and the performance of REITs.
As shown in Table 7, as for all the regressions of Model 5, there is only slightly significant
coefficient of “Dominant CEO” for the financial performance of REITs, as measured by Tobin’s
Q, as shown in regression (2), however, in general, there is no significant and consistent
coefficient of “Dominant CEO” for the financial performance of REITs. It implies that there is
no significant impact of the education of executive team of CEO and CFO in which CEO has
Top 20 school education and CFO has no Top 20 school education on the financial performance
of REITs.
However, as for regression (2), regression (4) and regression (6), as considering the
interactive term of “Dominant CEO” and “Cash Holdings” in Model 5, it shows that there is a
significantly negative relationship between the interactive term of “Dominant CEO” and “Cash
Holdings” and the financial performance of REITs, as measured by all three financial
performance indicators, Tobin’s Q, ROA (Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on Equity),
suggests that there is a significantly negative impact of the education of executive team of CEO
and CFO in which CEO has Top 20 school education and CFO has no Top 20 school education
on the financial performance of REITs, if there is enough discretionary cash.
In regression (1) and regression (2), as for “Cash Holdings”, it shows that there is a
significantly positive relationship between lagged cash-to-assets ratio and the financial
performance of REITs, as measured by Tobin’s Q, a 1% increase in cash-to-assets ratio leads to a
1.78%-2.31% increase in the financial performance of REITs, as measured by Tobin’s Q.
As for the control variables for the financial performance of REITs, there is a significantly
positive impact of “Assets” on financial performance of REITs, as measured by all three
financial performance indicators, Tobin’s Q, ROA (Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on
Equity), a 1% increase in lagged natural logarithm of assets leads to a 0.065%-0.068% increase
in Tobin’ Q, a 0.513%-0.529% increase in ROA (Return on Assets), and a 2.339%-2.379%
increase in ROE (Return on Equity). There is a significantly negative relationship between “Debt”
and the financial performance of REITs, as measured by ROA (Return on Assets), a 1% increase
in lagged debt-to-assets ratio leads to a 4.249% to 4.355% decrease in ROA (Return on Assets).
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As a proxy of profitability, it shows that there is a significantly positive relationship between
lagged ROE (Return on Equity) and the financial performance of REITs, suggests that the ROE
in previous quarter, that is, the profitability of previous quarter, has significantly positive impact
on financial performance of REITs in next quarter, specifically, a 1% increase in the lagged ROE
leads to a 0.002% increase in Tobin’s Q, a 0.023% increase in ROA and a 0.37% increase in
ROE.
In summary, Table 7 presents the results of OLS regressions of Model 5 that examines the
relationship between the education of executive team of CEO and CFO in which CEO has Top
20 school education and CFO has no Top 20 school education and the performance of REITs. In
the result, it shows that, there is no significant impact of the education of executive team of CEO
and CFO in which CEO has Top 20 school education and CFO has no Top 20 school education
on financial performance of REITs, and if there is enough discretionary cash, there is a
significantly negative impact of the education of executive team in which CEO has Top 20
school education and CFO has no Top 20 school education on the financial performance of
REITs. It indicates that the education of executive team of “Dominant CEO” that shows the
dominant role of CEO with high education as leading executives with lower education has no
significant impact on performance of REITs, however, the dominant role of CEO with high
education as leading executives with lower education significantly negatively affects the
performance of REITs, if there is enough discretionary cash.
As for Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7, Model 3, Model 4 and Model 5 examine the
relationship between the education of executive team of CEO and CFO and the performance of
REITs, as for the results of Model 3, Model 4 and Model 5 that are consistent with Hypothesis 2,
as considering the executive team of CEO and CFO, there is significantly positive relationship
between the education of executive team of CEO and CFO in which CEO has no high education
and CFO has high education and the performance of REITs, indicates that the education of
executive team of “CEO Leadership” that fully displays the leadership skill for the CEO with
lower education as leading executives with high education has significantly positive impact on
performance of REITs.
5.2.2 Summary of the Results of Model 1 to Model 5
As for the results of regressions of Model 1 and Model 2 shown in Table 3 and Table 4, for
the examination of the relationship between executive’s individual education and the
performance of REITs, it can be seen that there is no significant or better relationship between
executive’s individual education and the performance of REITs, however, if there is enough
discretionary cash, executive’s high individual education significantly negatively affects the
performance of REITs.
In addition, as for the results of regressions of Model 3, Model 4 and Model 5 shown in
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Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7, for the examination of the relationship between the education of
executive team of CEO and CFO and the performance of REITs, it suggests that there is
significantly positive relationship between the education of executive team of CEO and CFO in
which CEO has no Top 20 school education and CFO has Top 20 school education (“CEO
Leadership”) and the performance of REITs, indicates that the education of executive team of
“CEO Leadership” that fully displays the leadership skill for the CEO with lower education as
leading executives with high education has significantly positive impact on performance of
REITs.
Moreover, as for the education of executive team of CEO and CFO in which both CEO and
CFO have Top 20 school education (“Team Top 20”), and CEO has Top 20 school education and
CFO has no Top 20 school education (“Dominant CEO”), there is no significant relationships
between the education of “Team Top 20” and the performance of REITs, and also between the
education of “Dominant CEO” and the performance of REITs, however, if there is enough
discretionary cash, the education of “Team Top 20” and “Dominant CEO” significantly
negatively affect the performance of REITs. It indicates that the education of executive team of
“Team Top 20” that effectively shows the high-educated cooperation among the executives with
similar high education and the education of executive team of “Dominant CEO” that shows the
dominant role of CEO with high education as leading executives with lower education have no
significant impact on performance of REITs, however, the high-educated cooperation among the
executives with high education and the dominant role of CEO with high education as leading
executives with lower education significantly negatively affect the performance of REITs, if
there is enough discretionary cash.
As for the above results of the examinations of the relationships between executive’s
individual education and the performance of REITs, and the relationship between the education
of executive team of CEO and CFO and the performance of REITs, there are some related views
of point from some studies that can provide explanations and support.
Mishra and Metilda (2015) find that the overconfidence increases with the level of
education. In addition, Eichholtz and onder (2014) who focus on the relationship between the
CEO’s overconfidence and investment performance of REITs find that REITs with
overconfident CEOs tend to invest more, acquire more assets and are less likely to sell assets if
they have enough discretionary cash. Moreover, REITs with overconfident managers show lower
property investment performance, which is measured by net operating income and gain on sale
of real estate.
Therefore, it can be expected that executives who have high education tend to be
overconfident. They would be more aggressive on business strategies, overestimate investment
income and underestimate investment risk, and then their more aggressive business decisions
from the characteristic of overconfidence would negatively affect the company performance.
Back to this paper, as for the results of Model 1 and Model 2 that there is significantly
negative relationship between the interactive terms of executive’s individual education (“CEO
Top 20” and “CFO Top 20”) and “Cash Holdings” and the performance of REITs, it can be
expected that as two of the most important top executives who have significantly dominant
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power in business decision–making, CEO and CFO with high individual education tend to be
overconfident and if there is enough discretionary cash, their more aggressive business decisions
may negatively affect the performance of REITs.
Moreover, as for the results of Model 3 that there is positive relationship between “CEO
Leadership” and the performance of REITs, the executive team of “CEO Leadership” in which
CEO has no Top 20 school education and CFO has Top 20 school education fully displays the
leadership skill for the CEO with lower education as leading executives with high education and
can be considered as “good cooperation team”. It can be expected that CEO without high
individual education tends to be more approachable and better at listening to others opinions, it is
more frequently for them to adopt the high–quality ideas that have positive impact on company
performance from CFO with high individual education, as another important executive in top
executive team. Meanwhile, comparing with the CEO who are with high individual education
and overconfident, CEO without high individual education will be more cautious in assessing the
investment income and investment risk of the projects to ensure that the investment positively
affects the company performance. Therefore, the cooperation of the executive team in which
CEO has no Top 20 school education and CFO has Top 20 school education is expected to
positively affect the performance of REITs.
In addition, as for the results of Model 4 and Model 5 that there are negative relationships
between the interactive term of “Team Top 20” and “Cash Holdings” and the performance of
REITs, and also between the interactive term of “Dominant CEO” and “Cash Holdings” and the
performance of REITs. The executive team of “Team Top 20” and “Dominant CEO” in which
both CEO and CFO have Top 20 school education, and CEO has Top 20 school education and
CFO has no Top 20 school education, respectively, effectively show the high-educated
cooperation among the executives with similar high education and the dominant role of CEO
with high education as leading executives with lower education, respectively, and can be
considered as “overconfident team” and “overconfident director team”, respectively. Therefore,
it can be expected that if there is enough discretionary cash, these teams would be overconfident
to the projects that they invest in, overestimate the investment income and underestimate the
investment risk of the projects, and the more aggressive business decisions of the executive
teams of “Team Top 20” and “Dominant CEO” may negatively affect the performance of REITs.
5.2.3 Results of the Examination of the Relationship between the Education of Executive
Team of CEO, CFO and COO and the Performance of REITs
Table 8 and Table 9 show the results of Model 6, Model 7 and Model 8 that examine the
relationship between the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO and the financial
performance of REITs.
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**Insert Table 8 about here**
Regression (1) to Regression (6) in Table 8 show the results of the examination of the
relationship between the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in which,
regardless of CEO's individual education, there may be zero, one and two of CFO and COO with
Top 20 school education and the performance of REITs. Because the “Executives Top 20”
dummy does not focus on CEO’s individual education, Model 6 is more comprehensive to
introduce the “CEO Top 20” dummy.
As shown in Table 8, as for all the regressions of Model 6, it can be seen that there is no
significant coefficient of “CEO Top 20” for the financial performance of REITs, as measured by
Tobin’s Q, ROA (Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on Equity), suggests that there is no
significant impact of CEO’s individual education on financial performance of REITs.
In addition, there is no significant coefficient of “Executives Top 20” for the financial
performance of REITs, as measured by Tobin’s Q, ROA (Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on
Equity).
As for the results above, it suggests that there is no significant relationship between
executive’s individual education and the performance of REITs. However, as for the executive
team of CEO, CFO and COO, because “Executives Top 20” does not focus on the CEO’s
individual education, it includes various of executive teams of CEO, CFO and COO with
different combinations of individual education of CEO, CFO and COO. Therefore, there is no
definitely result of the relationship between the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and
COO and the financial performance of REITs, as shown in the result of “Executives Top 20” of
Model 6 in Table 8.
As for “Cash Holdings”, it shows that there is no significant relationship between lagged
cash-to-assets ratio and the financial performance of REITs, as measured by Tobin’s Q, ROA
(Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on Equity).
As for the control variables for the financial performance of REITs, there is a significantly
positive impact of “Assets” on financial performance of REITs, measured by all three financial
performance indicators, Tobin’s Q, ROA (Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on Equity), a 1%
increase in lagged natural logarithm of assets leads to a 0.075%-0.077% increase in Tobin’ Q, a
0.744%-0.756% increase in ROA (Return on Assets), and a 1.558%-1.63% increase in ROE
(Return on Equity). There is no significant relationship between “Debt” and the financial
performance of REITs. As a proxy of profitability, it shows that there is a significantly positive
relationship between lagged ROE (Return on Equity) and the financial performance of REITs,
suggests that the ROE in previous quarter, that is, the profitability of previous quarter, has
significantly positive impact on financial performance of REITs in next quarter, specifically, a
1% increase in the lagged ROE leads to a 0.003% increase in Tobin’s Q, a 0.020% increase in
ROA and a 0.225% increase in ROE.
In summary, Table 8 presents the results of OLS regressions of Model 6 that examines the
relationship between the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in which,
regardless of CEO’s individual education, there may be zero, one and two of CFO and COO with
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Top 20 school education and the performance of REITs. In the result, it shows that, there is no
significant relationship between executive’s individual education and the performance of REITs,
as measured by Tobin’s Q, ROA (Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on Equity). In addition, it
shows no definitely and explicitly relationship between the education of executive team of CEO,
CFO and COO on the performance of REITs. Therefore, this paper uses a stricter criterion of
CEO’s individual education in Model 7 and Model 8 for a more accurate and comprehensive
result of the relationship between the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO and
the performance of REITs.
**Insert Table 9 about here**
For a more accurate and comprehensive result, and because as shown in the Model 3 that
there is significantly positive relationship between the education of executive team of CEO and
CFO in which CEO has no Top 20 school education and CFO has Top 20 school education and
the performance of REITs, similar to the examination of the impact of the education of executive
team of CEO and CFO on performance of REITs, in Model 7 and Model 8, this paper divides the
executive team of CEO, CFO and COO into three categories, based on the different
combinations of executive’s individual education, and examines the relationship between the
education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in which there is one or two of CFO and
COO with Top 20 school education and the performance of REITs in Model 7, and the
relationship between the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in which there is at
least one of CFO and COO with Top 20 school education and the performance of REITs in
Model 8, as assuming that CEO in the executive team has no Top 20 school education.
Regression (1) to Regression (6) in Table 9 show the results of the examination of the
relationship between the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in which CEO has
no Top 20 school education and there is one, two or at least one of CFO and COO with Top 20
school education and the performance of REITs.
As shown in Table 9, as for the regression (1) to regression (3) of Model 7, first, “Team
Count_1” represents the executive team in which CEO has no Top 20 school education and one
of CFO and COO has Top 20 school education. It shows that there is significantly positive
impact of the education of executive team of “Team Count_1” on financial performance of
REITs, as measured by all the three financial performance indicators, Tobin’s Q, ROA (Return
on Assets) and ROE (Return on Equity). Second, “Team Count_2” represents the executive team
in which CEO has no Top 20 school education and both of CFO and COO have Top 20 school
education. It shows that there is slightly significantly positive impact of the education of
executive team of “Team Count_2” on financial performance of REITs, as measured by Tobin’s
Q.
As for the regression (4) to regression (6) of Model 8, as a robustness test of “Team
Count_1” and “Team Count_2”, “Team Count_12” represents the executive team in which CEO
has no Top 20 school education and at least one of CFO and COO has Top 20 school education.
It shows that there is significantly positive impact of the education of executive team of “Team
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Count_12” on financial performance of REITs, as measured by Tobin’s Q, ROA (Return on
Assets) and ROE (Return on Equity).
As for “Cash Holdings”, it shows that there is no significant relationship between lagged
cash-to-assets ratio and the financial performance of REITs, as measured by Tobin’s Q, ROA
(Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on Equity).
As for the control variables for the financial performance of REITs in Model 7, there is a
significantly positive impact of “Assets” on financial performance of REITs, measured by all
three financial performance indicators, Tobin’s Q, ROA (Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on
Equity), a 1% increase in lagged natural logarithm of assets leads to a 0.077% increase in Tobin’
Q, a 0.751% increase in ROA (Return on Assets), and a 1.615% increase in ROE (Return on
Equity). There is no significant relationship between “Debt” and the financial performance of
REITs, as measured by all three financial performance indicators, Tobin’s Q, ROA (Return on
Assets) and ROE (Return on Equity). As a proxy of profitability, it shows that there is a
significantly positive relationship between lagged ROE (Return on Equity) and the financial
performance of REITs, suggests that the ROE in previous quarter, that is, the profitability of
previous quarter, has significantly positive impact on financial performance of REITs in next
quarter, specifically, a 1% increase in the lagged ROE leads to a 0.003% increase in Tobin’s Q, a
0.019% increase in ROA and a 0.223% increase in ROE.
As for the control variables for the financial performance of REITs in Model 8, there is a
significantly positive impact of “Assets” on financial performance of REITs, measured by all
three financial performance indicators, Tobin’s Q, ROA (Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on
Equity), a 1% increase in lagged natural logarithm of assets leads to a 0.078% increase in Tobin’
Q, a 0.750% increase in ROA (Return on Assets), and a 1.602% increase in ROE (Return on
Equity). There is no significant relationship between “Debt” and the financial performance of
REITs, as measured by all three financial performance indicators, Tobin’s Q, ROA (Return on
Assets) and ROE (Return on Equity). As a proxy of profitability, it shows that there is a
significantly positive relationship between lagged ROE (Return on Equity) and the financial
performance of REITs, suggests that the ROE in previous quarter, that is, the profitability of
previous quarter, has significantly positive impact on financial performance of REITs in next
quarter, specifically, a 1% increase in the lagged ROE leads to a 0.003% increase in Tobin’s Q, a
0.019% increase in ROA and a 0.223% increase in ROE.
In summary, Table 9 presents the results of OLS regressions of Model 7 and Model 8 that
examine the relationship between the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in
which CEO has no Top 20 school education and there is one or two of CFO and COO with Top
20 school education and the performance of REITs, and the relationship between the education
of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in which CEO has no Top 20 school education and
there is at least one of CFO and COO with Top 20 school education and the performance of
REITs, respectively. In the result, it shows that, there is significantly positive impact of the
education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in which CEO has no Top 20 school
education and one of CFO and COO has Top 20 school education on financial performance of
REITs. In addition, there is also a slightly significantly positive impact of the education of
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executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in which CEO has no Top 20 school education and both
CFO and COO have Top 20 school education on financial performance of REITs. As a
robustness test, it shows that there is significantly positive impact of the executive team of CEO,
CFO and COO in which CEO has no Top 20 school education and at least one of CFO and COO
has Top 20 school education on financial performance of REITs.
It indicates that, similar to the executive team of “CEO Leadership”, the executive team of
CEO, CFO and COO in which CEO has no Top 20 school education and one, two or at least one
of CFO and COO has Top 20 school education can be also considered as “good cooperation
team”, and the education of the executive team shows significantly positive impact on
performance of REITs.
Therefore, it shows a more explicit and accurate result on the relationship between the
education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO and the performance of REITs. As for
Table 9, Model 7 and Model 8 examine the relationship between the education of executive team
of CEO, CFO and COO and the performance of REITs, as for the results of Model 7 and Model
8 that are consistent with Hypothesis 3, as considering executive team of CEO, CFO and COO,
there is a significantly positive relationship between the education of the executive team of CEO,
CFO and COO in which CEO has no Top 20 school education and at least one of CFO and COO
has Top 20 school education and the performance of REITs.
In addition, comparing with the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in
which CEO has no Top 20 school education and both CFO and COO have Top 20 school
education, there is a greater significantly positive relationship between the education of
executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in which CEO has no Top 20 school education and one
of CFO and COO has Top 20 school education and the performance of REITs. Therefore, the
best executive team that has a greater positive impact on performance of REITs is the one in
which CEO has no high education, and one of CFO and COO has high education.
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6. Conclusion and Discussion
This paper focuses on the relationship between executive’s education and the performance
of U.S, REITs, by using the data of executive’s education and the financial performance of 288
U.S. REITs from 2000 to 2018. As for empirical analysis, this paper employs two parts of
empirical examinations to examine the relationship between executive’s education and the
performance of REITs at an executive individual level and an executive team level.
In the first part of empirical examination, this paper examines the relationship between
executive’s individual education and the performance of REITs. In particular, this paper
examines the impact of CEO’s individual education and CFO’s individual education on
performance of REITs, respectively. In the result, consistent with Hypothesis 1, this paper finds
that there is no significant or better relationship between executive’s individual education and the
performance of REITs, as considering CEO’s and CFO’s individual education. However, as
considering the interactive impact of executive’s individual education and discretionary cash,
there is significantly negative relationship between the interactive term of executive’s individual
education and discretionary cash and the performance of REITs, it implies that executive’s high
individual education negatively affects the performance of REITs, if there is enough
discretionary cash.
In the second part of examination, this paper examines the relationship between the
education of executive team and the performance of REITs by focusing on the impact of the
cooperation of executives with different individual education in the executive team on
performance of REITs and employing a two-step examination.
In the first step, this paper examines the relationship between the education of executive
team of CEO and CFO and the performance of REITs. In the result, consistent with Hypothesis 2,
this paper finds that there is significantly positive relationship between the education of
executive team of CEO and CFO in which CEO has no Top 20 school education and CFO has
Top 20 school education (“CEO Leadership”) and the performance of REITs. As for other
executive teams of CEO and CFO with different combinations of individual education of CEO
and CFO, there is no significant relationships between the education of executive team of CEO
and CFO in which CEO has Top 20 school education and CFO has no Top 20 school education
(“Dominant CEO”) and the performance of REITs, and also between the education of executive
team of CEO and CFO in which both CEO and CFO have Top 20 school education (“Team Top
20”) and the performance of REITs, respectively. However, as considering the interactive impact
of the education of executive team of CEO and CFO and discretionary cash, there is significantly
negative impact of the education of executive team of “Dominant CEO” and “Team Top 20” on
performance of REITs, respectively, it implies that the education of executive team of
“Dominant CEO” and “Team Top 20” negatively affect the performance of REITs, if there is
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enough discretionary cash.
In summary, based on the views of point of some studies related to the overconfidence and
the performance of REITs, this paper considers that, as for the results that, first, the education of
executive team of “CEO Leadership” that fully displays CEO’s leadership skill and can be
considered as “good cooperation team” has significantly positive impact on performance of
REITs, and second, there is no significant impact of the executive’s high individual education,
the education of executive team of “Dominant CEO” that shows the dominant role of CEO with
high education as leading executives with lower education and can be considered as
“overconfident director team”, and also the education of executive team of “Team Top 20” that
shows the high-educated cooperation among the executives with similar high education and can
be considered as “overconfident team” on performance of REITs, respectively, while, as
considering the impact of the interactive term of executive’s education and discretionary cash,
there is significantly negative impact of the interactive term of executive’s individual education
and discretionary cash, and the interactive term of the education of executive team with
highly-educated executives (“Dominant CEO” and “Team Top 20”) and discretionary cash on
performance of REITs, respectively, can be explained by the overconfidence of executives with
high education and the negative impact of more aggressive business strategies of overconfident
executives on company performance.
In the second step, as a more comprehensive empirical examination, this paper examines the
relationship between the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO and the
performance of REITs, by employing two examinations.
In the first examination, this paper examines the relationship between the education of
executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in which, regardless of CEO’s individual education,
there may be zero, one and two of CFO and COO with Top 20 school education and the
performance of REITs. In the result, it shows that, consistent with Hypothesis 1, there is no
significant relationship between executive’s individual education and the performance of REITs.
In addition, there is no explicit and definite result of the relationship between the education of
executive team of CEO, CFO and COO and the performance of REITs.
Therefore, in the second examination, for a more accurate and comprehensive result, this
paper uses a stricter criterion of CEO’s individual education, as assuming that CEO in the
executive team has no Top 20 school education, this paper examines the relationship between the
education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in which CEO has no Top 20 school
education and there is one, two or at least one of CFO and COO with Top 20 school education
and the performance of REITs, respectively.
In the result, consistent with Hypothesis 3, this paper finds that there is significantly
positive relationship between the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in which
CEO has no Top 20 school education and at least one of CFO and COO has Top 20 school
education and the performance of REITs, and particularly, comparing with the education of
executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in which CEO has no Top 20 school education and both
CFO and COO have Top 20 school education, there is a more significantly positive relationship
between the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in which CEO has no Top 20
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school education and one of CFO and COO has Top 20 school education and the performance of
REITs. Therefore, the best executive team that has a greater positive impact on performance of
REITs is the one in which CEO has no high education, and one of CFO and COO has high
education.
In the further research, for more general empirical examination, it would be more
comprehensive to study the relationship between the executive’s education and company
financial performance on the level of the whole industry.
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Figure 1 Individual Education of Executives of REITs
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Figure 2 Education of Executive Team of CEO and CFO of REITs
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Figure 3 Education of Executive Team of CEO, CFO and COO of REITs
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Table 1 shows the description of variables statistics.
VARIABLES Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Panel A—Executive’s education
CEO Top 20 19,730 0.23 0.42 0 1
CFO Top 20 19,730 0.12 0.33 0 1
Team Top 20 19,730 0.05 0.22 0 1
Dominant CEO 19,730 0.18 0.39 0 1
CEO Leadership 19,730 0.07 0.26 0 1
Executives Top 20 19,730 0.22 0.45 0 2
Team Count_1 19,730 0.11 0.31 0 1
Team Count_2 19,730 0.01 0.08 0 1
Team Count_12 19,730 0.12 0.32 0 1
Panel B—Performance
Tobin’s Q 12,491 1.48 1.09 0.34 35.49
ROA 12,766 2.59 11.95 -397.53 322.40
ROE 12,372 6.44 46.43 -905.31 945.77
Panel C—Financial Control Variables
Cash Holdings 12,700 0.05 0.08 0 0.99
Assets 12,718 14.42 1.47 7.85 17.46
Debt 12,718 0.50 0.20 0 2.26
Profitability 12,154 6.43 46.26 -905.31 945.77
Notes: Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. In Panel A, Executive’s education is defined using the
executive’s Top 20 school education dummy, at an executive individual level and an executive team level. Top
20 school education dummy refers to the education received by the executive is from the Top 20 schools. In
Panel B, Performance is defined using the data of quarterly financial performance of U.S. REITs, specifically,
Tobin’s Q, ROA (Return on Assets), and ROE (Return on Equity) are used as financial performance indicators
and presented in decimals. This paper uses a set of financial control variables, including the ratio of cash to
total assets (in decimals, shown as “Cash Holdings”), the ratio of debt to total assets (in decimals, shown as
“Debt”), the natural logarithm of total assets (shown as “Assets”) and Return of Equity (ROE, shown as
“Profitability”). All of the financial control variables are lagged. The data range from 2000 to 2018.
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Table 2
Table 2 shows the proportions of each value of “Executives Top 20”.
VARIABLES
Proportion
Count Value =0 Count Value =1 Count Value =2
Executives Top 20 0.80 0.18 0.02
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Table 3
Table 3 shows the results of Model 1 that examines the relationship between CEO’s individual
education and the performance of REITs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q ROA ROA ROE ROE
CEO Top 20 -0.052 0.056 0.023 0.371 -0.006 1.468
[0.057] [0.047] [0.310] [0.361] [0.912] [1.042]
X Cash Holdings -3.096*** -9.740 -41.214**
[1.095] [6.688] [19.521]
Cash Holdings 1.377** 2.374*** -1.761 1.252 14.553 27.383
[0.553] [0.825] [4.285] [5.995] [15.346] [20.419]
Assets -0.001 0.001 0.233 0.242 1.353*** 1.387***
[0.067] [0.066] [0.158] [0.157] [0.469] [0.464]
Debt -0.295* -0.289* -6.832*** -6.796*** -8.212 -8.071
[0.172] [0.168] [1.305] [1.272] [5.576] [5.488]
Profitability 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.303*** 0.302***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.004] [0.005] [0.071] [0.071]
Constant 1.555 1.475 2.464 2.214 -11.793* -12.837*
[1.035] [1.009] [2.630] [2.580] [6.662] [6.600]
ear-Quarter FE es es es es es es
Property Type FE es es es es es es
Observations 10,233 10,233 10,540 10,540 10,521 10,521
Adjusted R-squared 0.044 0.053 0.045 0.046 0.097 0.098
Notes: Table 3 presents the results of OLS regressions of Model 1 that examines the relationship between
CEO’s individual education and the performance of REITs. CEO’s individual education is defined using the
“CEO Top 20” dummy.
These regressions use a set of financial control variables, including the lagged cash-to-total-assets ratio, shown
as “Cash Holdings”, the lagged natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size, shown as “Assets”,
the lagged debt-to-total-assets ratio, shown as “Debt”, and the lagged quarterly ROE (Return on Equity),
shown as “Profitability”. The data range from 2000 to 2018. Heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered
standard errors are in brackets. All regressions in Model 1 are with the standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity, clustered by the firm, and also absorb the fixed effects of each quarter of the whole period
and the property type. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 4
Table 4 shows the results of Model 2 that examines the relationship between CFO’s individual
education and the performance of REITs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q ROA ROA ROE ROE
CFO Top 20 0.053 0.122** 0.128 0.357 2.201** 3.630***
[0.042] [0.056] [0.405] [0.378] [1.095] [1.107]
X Cash Holdings -2.073** -6.747 -42.243*
[0.866] [6.945] [23.889]
Cash Holdings 1.367** 1.768*** -1.776 -0.591 14.286 21.758
[0.556] [0.674] [4.289] [5.122] [15.462] [17.512]
Assets -0.006 -0.004 0.228 0.234 1.249** 1.288***
[0.069] [0.068] [0.162] [0.162] [0.487] [0.490]
Debt -0.291* -0.280* -6.839*** -6.796*** -8.311 -8.041
[0.171] [0.168] [1.316] [1.314] [5.632] [5.601]
Profitability 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.303*** 0.302***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.005] [0.071] [0.071]
Constant 1.586 1.539 2.532 2.378 -10.596 -11.553*
[1.045] [1.030] [2.693] [2.699] [6.873] [6.981]
ear-Quarter FE es es es es es es
Property Type FE es es es es es es
Observations 10,233 10,233 10,540 10,540 10,521 10,521
Adjusted R-squared 0.044 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.097 0.098
Notes: Table 4 presents the results of OLS regressions of Model 2 that examines the relationship between
CFO’s individual education and performance of REITs. CFO’s individual education is defined using the “CFO
Top 20” dummy.
These regressions use a set of financial control variables, including the lagged cash-to-total-assets ratio, shown
as “Cash Holdings”, the lagged natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size, shown as “Assets”,
the lagged debt-to-total-assets ratio, shown as “Debt”, and the lagged quarterly ROE (Return on Equity),
shown as “Profitability”. The data range from 2000 to 2018. Heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered
standard errors are in brackets. All regressions in Model 2 are with the standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity, clustered by the firm, and also absorb the fixed effects of each quarter of the whole period
and the property type. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 5
Table 5 shows the results of Model 3 that examines the relationship between the education of
executive team of CEO and CFO and the performance of REITs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q ROA ROA ROE ROE
CEO Leadership 0.109** 0.163*** 0.730** 1.323** 3.992** 6.407***
[0.053] [0.058] [0.353] [0.578] [1.653] [2.369]
X Cash Holdings -1.698 -19.091 -77.855
[1.049] [13.501] [57.936]
Cash Holdings 1.796** 1.962** 4.200 5.816 16.816 23.431
[0.800] [0.879] [5.676] [6.132] [19.673] [19.661]
Assets 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.506*** 0.510*** 2.300*** 2.317***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.191] [0.194] [0.636] [0.635]
Debt -0.138 -0.141 -4.252* -4.269** -11.326 -11.396
[0.206] [0.206] [2.167] [2.163] [7.485] [7.372]
Profitability 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.369*** 0.370***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.005] [0.005] [0.107] [0.107]
Constant 0.457 0.447 -3.219 -3.341 -25.621** -26.079**
[0.304] [0.304] [3.505] [3.547] [10.264] [10.256]
ear-Quarter FE es es es es es es
Property Type FE es es es es es es
Observations 6,722 6,722 6,765 6,765 6,751 6,751
Adjusted R-squared 0.201 0.206 0.049 0.051 0.135 0.137
Notes: Table 5 presents the results of OLS regressions of Model 3 that examines the relationship between the
education of executive team of CEO and CFO and the performance of REITs. The education of executive team
of CEO and CFO in Model 3 is defined using the “CEO Leadership” dummy.
These regressions use a set of financial control variables, including the lagged cash-to-total-assets ratio, shown
as “Cash Holdings”, the lagged natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size, shown as “Assets”,
the lagged debt-to-total-assets ratio, shown as “Debt”, and the lagged quarterly ROE (Return on Equity),
shown as “Profitability”. The data range from 2000 to 2018. Heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered
standard errors are in brackets. All regressions in Model 3 are with the standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity, clustered by the firm, and also absorb the fixed effects of each quarter of the whole period
and the property type. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 6
Table 6 shows the results of Model 4 that examines the relationship between the education of
executive team of CEO and CFO and the performance of REITs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q ROA ROA ROE ROE
Team Top 20 -0.049 0.027 -0.649 -0.452 -0.484 0.341
[0.050] [0.050] [0.717] [0.806] [1.148] [1.351]
X Cash Holdings -2.152** -5.412 -22.667
[0.961] [7.477] [22.035]
Cash Holdings 1.795** 2.105** 4.255 5.051 16.382 19.755
[0.798] [0.895] [5.652] [6.612] [19.628] [22.298]
Assets 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.537*** 0.541*** 2.353*** 2.368***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.205] [0.204] [0.648] [0.653]
Debt -0.137 -0.128 -4.238* -4.213** -11.311 -11.211
[0.206] [0.203] [2.166] [2.137] [7.457] [7.442]
Profitability 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.370*** 0.370***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.005] [0.006] [0.107] [0.108]
Constant 0.433 0.396 -3.529 -3.622 -25.843** -26.228**
[0.311] [0.304] [3.693] [3.650] [10.517] [10.644]
ear-Quarter FE es es es es es es
Property Type FE es es es es es es
Observations 6,722 6,722 6,765 6,765 6,751 6,751
Adjusted R-squared 0.196 0.207 0.049 0.049 0.134 0.134
Notes: Table 6 presents the results of OLS regressions of Model 4 that examines the relationship between the
education of executive team of CEO and CFO and the performance of REITs. The education of executive team
of CEO and CFO in Model 4 is defined using the “Team Top 20” dummy.
These regressions use a set of financial control variables, including the lagged cash-to-total-assets ratio, shown
as “Cash Holdings”, the lagged natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size, shown as “Assets”,
the lagged debt-to-total-assets ratio, shown as “Debt”, and the lagged quarterly ROE (Return on Equity),
shown as “Profitability”. The data range from 2000 to 2018. Heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered
standard errors are in brackets. All regressions in Model 4 are with the standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity, clustered by the firm, and also absorb the fixed effects of each quarter of the whole period
and the property type. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 7
Table 7 shows the results of Model 5 that examines the relationship between the education of
executive team of CEO and CFO and the performance of REITs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q ROA ROA ROE ROE
Dominant CEO -0.002 0.094* -0.069 0.511 -0.446 1.001
[0.043] [0.050] [0.291] [0.339] [1.171] [1.344]
X Cash Holdings -2.966*** -17.595** -43.837*
[1.043] [7.829] [22.890]
Cash Holdings 1.784** 2.311** 4.091 7.351 16.214 24.433
[0.799] [0.952] [5.656] [6.785] [19.509] [22.784]
Assets 0.065*** 0.068*** 0.513*** 0.529*** 2.339*** 2.379***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.193] [0.193] [0.626] [0.633]
Debt -0.138 -0.152 -4.249* -4.355** -11.300 -11.581
[0.206] [0.203] [2.162] [2.134] [7.450] [7.243]
Profitability 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.370*** 0.368***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.006] [0.006] [0.107] [0.108]
Constant 0.457 0.396 -3.211 -3.519 -25.562** -26.326**
[0.310] [0.308] [3.535] [3.497] [10.234] [10.300]
ear-Quarter FE es es es es es es
Property Type FE es es es es es es
Observations 6,722 6,722 6,765 6,765 6,751 6,751
Adjusted R-squared 0.195 0.222 0.049 0.051 0.134 0.135
Notes: Table 7 presents the results of OLS regressions of Model 5 that examines the relationship between the
education of executive team of CEO and CFO and the performance of REITs. The education of executive team
of CEO and CFO in Model 5 is defined using the “Dominant CEO” dummy.
These regressions use a set of financial control variables, including the lagged cash-to-total-assets ratio, shown
as “Cash Holdings”, the lagged natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size, shown as “Assets”,
the lagged debt-to-total-assets ratio, shown as “Debt”, and the lagged quarterly ROE (Return on Equity),
shown as “Profitability”. The data range from 2000 to 2018. Heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered
standard errors are in brackets. All regressions in Model 5 are with the standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity, clustered by the firm, and also absorb the fixed effects of each quarter of the whole period
and the property type. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 8
Table 8 shows the results of Model 6 that examines the relationship between the education of
executive team of CEO, CFO and COO and the financial performance of REITs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q ROA ROA ROE ROE
CEO Top 20 -0.071 -0.400 -2.452
[0.065] [0.506] [1.975]
Executives Top 20 0.046 0.036 -0.201 -0.261 0.660 0.288
[0.036] [0.035] [0.451] [0.498] [1.003] [0.926]
Cash Holdings 1.605 1.580 1.967 1.809 13.021 12.054
[1.069] [1.069] [7.146] [7.047] [15.415] [15.440]
Assets 0.077** 0.075** 0.756*** 0.744*** 1.630** 1.558*
[0.030] [0.030] [0.267] [0.257] [0.794] [0.820]
Debt -0.070 -0.084 -1.973 -2.045 -0.397 -0.846
[0.247] [0.246] [3.431] [3.383] [7.249] [7.065]
Profitability 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.019** 0.020** 0.224** 0.225**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.010] [0.009] [0.091] [0.092]
Constant 0.231 0.248 -7.864 -7.783 -18.661 -18.164
[0.440] [0.442] [5.214] [5.150] [11.604] [11.751]
ear-Quarter FE es es es es es es
Property Type FE es es es es es es
Observations 3,436 3,436 3,453 3,453 3,449 3,449
Adjusted R-squared 0.189 0.184 0.032 0.032 0.071 0.070
Notes: Table 8 presents the results of OLS regressions of Model 6 that examines the relationship between the
education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO and the performance of REITs. CEO's individual
education in Model 6 is defined using the “CEO Top 20” dummy. The education of executive team of CEO,
CFO and COO in Model 6 is defined using the “Executives Top 20” dummy.
These regressions use a set of financial control variables, including the lagged cash-to-total-assets ratio, shown
as “Cash Holdings”, the lagged natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size, shown as “Assets”,
the lagged debt-to-total-assets ratio, shown as “Debt”, and the lagged quarterly ROE (Return on Equity),
shown as “Profitability”. The data range from 2000 to 2018. Heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered
standard errors are in brackets. All regressions in Model 6 are with the standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity, clustered by the firm, and also absorb the fixed effects of each quarter of the whole period
and the property type. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 9
Table 9 shows the results of Model 7 and Model 8 that examine the relationship between the
education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO and the financial performance of REITs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Tobin’s Q ROA ROE Tobin’s Q ROA ROE
Team Count_1 0.144** 1.070** 3.187*
[0.060] [0.504] [1.750]
Team Count_2 0.195* 0.935 2.103
[0.118] [0.944] [2.199]
Cash Holdings 1.613 1.909 12.748 1.615 1.904 12.703
[1.061] [7.012] [15.310] [1.061] [7.008] [15.302]
Assets 0.077*** 0.751*** 1.615** 0.078*** 0.750*** 1.602**
[0.029] [0.246] [0.802] [0.028] [0.246] [0.810]
Debt -0.081 -2.335 -1.102 -0.083 -2.330 -1.061
[0.245] [3.117] [6.827] [0.245] [3.119] [6.854]
Profitability 0.003*** 0.019** 0.223** 0.003*** 0.019** 0.223**
[0.001] [0.009] [0.092] [0.001] [0.009] [0.092]
Team Count_12 0.150** 1.052** 3.044*
[0.058] [0.471] [1.575]
Constant 0.197 -8.118 -19.427* 0.188 -8.096 -19.250*
[0.430] [5.106] [11.500] [0.425] [5.101] [11.577]
ear-Quarter FE es es es es es es
Property Type es es es es es es
Observations 3,436 3,453 3,449 3,436 3,453 3,449
Adjusted R-squared 0.197 0.033 0.071 0.197 0.034 0.072
Notes: Table 9 presents the results of OLS regressions of Model 7 and Model 8 that examines the relationship
between the education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO and the performance of REITs. The
education of executive team of CEO, CFO and COO in Model 7 and Model 8 is defined using the “Team
Count_1” dummy, “Team Count_2” dummy and “Team Count_12” dummy.
These regressions use a set of financial control variables, including the lagged cash-to-total-assets ratio, shown
as “Cash Holdings”, the lagged natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size, shown as “Assets”,
the lagged debt-to-total-assets ratio, shown as “Debt”, and the lagged quarterly ROE (Return on Equity),
shown as “Profitability”. The data range from 2000 to 2018. Heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered
standard errors are in brackets. All regressions in Model 7 and Model 8 are with the standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity, clustered by the firm, and also absorb the fixed effects of each quarter of the whole period
and the property type. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
